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Executive summary
 
New art students are often advised to close off their pre-existing 
knowledge about the objects they are trying to draw, and instead focus on 
angles, spaces, lines, proportions and relationships. Development 
practitioners similarly need to close off their mental models about 
governance and development that are rooted in OECD experience. 
Instead of prioritising reform of formal institutions, they should look at 
the structures, relationships, interests and incentives that underpin them. 
This does not mean rejecting the longer-term goal of helping poor 
countries to build inclusive, rules-based public authority. But in the 
short-to-medium term it may be more useful to explore whether 
relationship-based arrangements could offer a way to make progress.
This paper draws together findings from a five-year research programme 
by the Centre for the Future State. It explores in an open-minded way 
how elements of public authority are being created through complex 
processes of bargaining between state and society actors, and the 
interaction of formal and informal institutions. For example, a study in 
Egypt shows how informal relations between politicians and investors 
that build on common interests can compensate for weak formal property 
rights and contract enforcement, and boost investment in the short-to-
medium term. Studies of successful public sector reform in São Paulo 
suggest that formal participatory mechanisms may be less important as 
channels for policy influence than informal networks and relationships. 
Research in South Asia shows that informal village-level councils remain 
very influential, and can complement or undermine formal institutions. 
Studies in Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia show how governments’ need for 
tax revenue has driven implicit or explicit bargaining with citizens, with 
the potential to enhance accountability.
Informal institutions and personalised relationships are usually seen as 
governance problems, but the research suggests that they can also be part 
of the solution. All the findings have implications for policymakers. For 
example, they should prioritise international action to improve financial 
regulation and constrain criminal activity, thus counteracting perverse 
incentives for political elites to perpetuate fragile states. Instead of 
focusing exclusively on improving the formal investment climate, they 
could do more to facilitate dialogue between politicians and investors and 
support collective action by business associations. Policymakers should be 
more alert to ways in which the design of public programmes influences 
opportunities and incentives for collective action to demand better 
services. Efforts to improve local governance need to take more account 
of informal village-level institutions. Tax reforms should prioritise equity, 
transparency and improved collection.
But the value of this research for policymakers does not reside only – or even 
primarily – in a list of policy messages. It makes a more important, broader 
point. Programmes to improve the investment climate, strengthen the rule of 
law, or fight corruption do not fail just for lack of ‘ownership’ or attention to 
politics. They fail because they make the wrong starting assumption: that 
progressive change consists in, and can be achieved through, strengthening 
formal, rules-based institutions that reflect a clear division between public 
and private spheres of life. The key to making progress in the short-to-
medium term may not be direct external intervention to orchestrate and 
support rules-based reform, but more indirect strategies to shift or influence 
the incentives and interests of local actors.
With this in mind, the research suggests a list of questions that seem 
particularly salient in understanding causes of bad governance and 
identifying ways of supporting more constructive bargaining between 
public and private actors. They are likely to be relevant in a great variety 
of circumstances. What is shaping the interests of political elites? (Sources 
of revenue are likely to be critical.) What is shaping relations between 
politicians and investors, and might they have common interests in 
supporting productive investment? What might stimulate and sustain 
collective action by social groups to demand better services? What 
informal local institutions are at work, and how are they shaping 
development outcomes? Where does government get its revenue from, 
and how is that shaping its relationships with citizens?
This way of thinking about governance and development implies that 
donors need to reassess their own role in the process, and their traditional 
approaches to managing ‘donor-recipient’ relationships. But the first step 
is for them to change their mental models, and to stop viewing the world 
through an OECD lens. Without this they will not make the necessary 
investment in understanding local political dynamics, or make the (often 
uncomfortable) changes needed to their own organisation, values, 
practices and behaviour. 
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Introduction
One of the first things new art students are taught is to close off their 
existing knowledge about the objects they are trying to draw. They know 
that a chair has a back and a seat of roughly equal proportions, and four 
legs of identical length. But this knowledge is distinctly unhelpful in trying 
to capture a three-dimensional image of a chair in a two-dimensional 
medium, and to deal with the challenges of perspective and foreshortening. 
Instead, they are instructed to look at what is in front of their eyes, to 
forget their mental model of a chair, and to draw exactly what they see.
Development practitioners similarly need to close off their existing 
assumptions and mental models about governance and development. Their 
default position is to look at the world from the perspective of a 
‘developed’ country, aspiring to introduce governance reforms that would 
align the institutions of poor countries in the South more closely with those 
of an OECD state. The goal includes an elected executive and legislature, a 
rules-based bureaucracy, an independent judiciary, a security apparatus 
under civilian control, and a regulated market economy – in short, effective, 
accountable public institutions that can support a broad range of civil, 
political, economic and social rights. The conventional donor approach to 
governance has been to analyse problems in developing countries in terms 
of deficiencies when compared to this ideal model.
Like an inept artist who seizes a pencil and draws a chair as she expects it 
to look, without pausing to consider the relationship between lines and 
angles and spaces, so Western policymakers too often view governance and 
development challenges in terms of their model of a developed state, and 
rush to find solutions without stopping to ask themselves what they can 
actually see. 
The drawing metaphor works only up to a point: development 
practitioners, after all, seek not just to capture an accurate image of a 
society and polity, but also to change it. But for both art students and 
donors what sounds like simple advice – to close off their existing models 
and preconceptions – is surprisingly difficult. Students of drawing are 
sometimes advised to stop naming things as they draw: to stop thinking 
about a chair, an arm, a back, a leg, and to think instead about the angle of 
one line in relation to another, or the ‘negative space’ surrounding an 
object. One well-known teacher (Edwards 2008) advocates an initial 
exercise of copying a drawing that has first been turned upside down, so 
that the brain switches off pre-existing knowledge about specific objects 
and focuses instead on angles, spaces, lines, proportions and relationships.
Western policymakers increasingly recognise that improving governance 
involves far more than transferring formal institutions from rich to poor 
countries. Yet they find it very hard to discard developed country models. 
Development 
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They mostly come from or live in OECD states; they are driven by 
normative values (rights, democracy, poverty reduction); they work for 
organisations that are supply-driven and have short time horizons; and 
many have hard-won professional knowledge. Such knowledge – about 
the law, or private investment, or public expenditure management, or 
delivery of water, health and education services – is entirely valid and 
indeed essential in certain contexts. But it can get in the way of attempts 
to understand what is really driving behaviour and development 
outcomes in poor countries and fragile states. 
Another set of assumptions that gets in the way is about the role of 
donors. Implicit in much Western policy relating to developing countries 
is still that West is best, that developed countries have the answers, that 
they need to take the lead in finding solutions, and that aid is a primary 
engine of development. But power is shifting away from OECD countries, 
and their fiscal situations mean that their governments will be less 
important in future as either sources of capital to poor countries or 
influence at a global level. China has global influence and offers an 
alternative model of development, as well as alternative sources of public 
and private capital. The traditional approach to managing donor-
recipient relations, with DAC (Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD) member states in the lead, is rapidly becoming history (Harris et 
al. 2009).
This paper draws together findings from a five-year research programme1 
by the Centre for the Future State (CFS) located at the Institute of 
Development Studies, University of Sussex. The central research question 
is how to increase effective, accountable public authority in poor 
countries of the global South. The paper offers development practitioners 
a fresh perspective – an upside-down view of governance – in two senses. 
It focuses less on the destination – formal, rules-based democratic and 
market institutions – and more on the means of getting there, preferring 
an open-minded exploration of how elements of effective public authority 
are actually being created in a variety of ways. And it suggests that 
instead of viewing informal arrangements as a major part of the 
governance problem, they could also be part of the solution. This does 
not mean rejecting the longer-term goal of helping poor countries to build 
inclusive, rules-based public authority. But in the short-to-medium term it 
may be useful to explore whether relationship-based arrangements could 
offer a better way to make progress.
1  This is the second phase of a research programme led by the Centre for the Future State, 
running from 2005–2010. Findings from the first phase (2000–2005) were reported in 
‘Signposts to More Effective States: Responding to Governance Challenges in Developing 
Countries’ (IDS 2005).
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This means looking much more carefully at the structures, relationships, 
institutional spaces, interests and incentives that underpin the creation of 
formal institutions. Returning to our drawing metaphor, the good news is 
that students who do manage to close off unhelpful models and focus on 
what they can actually see produce surprisingly good results. Most people 
can learn to draw.
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1.1 The governance puzzle 
Over the past two decades, ‘governance’ has come to be seen as a core 
development problem. There is widespread concern – stimulated by the 
plight of so-called fragile states – that many governments of poor 
countries are unable to exercise effective, accountable public authority. 
They are unable to control their territories and populations, often ceding 
ground to armed groups and criminal networks. They are unable to 
deliver basic public goods and services. Where authority does exist, it 
may be coercive and lack legitimacy. Power is concentrated in relatively 
few hands. Governments are unresponsive to large populations: poor 
people, women, and specific regional, ethnic or linguistic groups are 
politically excluded.
OECD governments are now spending over US$10 billion a year on 
governance interventions. There has been an explosion of research, 
actors, initiatives and approaches. Yet practitioners still have little reason 
to be confident that they know how to improve governance. Evaluations 
have shown the limitations of programmes designed to strengthen rules-
based approaches through civil service reform, anti-corruption measures, 
rule of law programmes, democracy support, or attempts to improve the 
investment climate (World Bank 2008a; Norad 2009). There is growing 
recognition that institutional models cannot be transferred into very 
different social and political environments and be expected to take root 
and function as they do in OECD countries. 
A fresh look at 
governance  1
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1.2 A new conventional wisdom?
There are therefore good reasons for taking a fresh look at governance. 
And indeed a new conventional wisdom is emerging. The Paris 
Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action reflect this in calling for local 
ownership and country-led development strategies – although they have 
little to say about what these might involve or how they could be 
negotiated. There is increasing donor rhetoric about the importance of 
politics, and the need to ‘look behind the facade’ of formal institutions to 
detect the ‘real’ location of power (DFID 2009a; Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2008). Extensive work by the DAC and others on fragile 
states is highlighting the political fundamentals of state building (OECD/
DAC 2010). There is growing enthusiasm for using political economy 
analysis to help better identify and manage the risks associated with 
particular policy reforms and to identify more politically feasible 
strategies for implementing them. 
Much of this is positive. It represents a move away from crude 
governance conditionality and ‘best practice’ approaches. Donor 
statements increasingly recognise that local political dynamics matter, and 
that outsiders should aim to facilitate and support change, rather than 
demand or try to enforce it. Some donors underline the need to 
understand country context, historical trajectories, the interests of key 
stakeholders and the factors that are shaping them. They recognise that 
the dynamics of a reform process may itself create new opportunities 
(World Bank 2008b, 2009; DFID 2009b).
But such approaches have their limitations. The core objective of the 
analysis is usually to improve the effectiveness of aid operations. The aim 
is to find practical solutions – often to development problems identified 
by donors. There is a tendency to attach labels to problems, and to see 
political patronage, rent seeking, and vested interests as ‘pathologies’ to 
be addressed through reforms that promote accountability, transparency 
and rules-based behaviour (World Bank 2008c). This risks over-
simplifying a very complex reality, and can induce unwarranted optimism 
about the ability of donors to facilitate and support reform coalitions.
Moreover, there is often a gap between donor rhetoric and the reality of 
what they do. Competing objectives, including urgent national security 
concerns, can get in the way of more nuanced, incremental approaches. It 
can be difficult to reconcile the implications of political analysis with the 
institutional incentives of donor agencies. Their instinctive response is to 
‘manage’ the local politics rather than see them as integral to finding a 
way forward. The default position of thinking in terms of Western models 
all too readily kicks back in.
 
It can be 
difficult to 
reconcile the 
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This matters because it risks limiting the menu of options or – to return 
to our drawing metaphor – it risks stopping the artist seeing things she 
does not expect to see. 
Two examples may help illustrate this: 
 · A now-familiar case – that has inspired one of the CFS research streams 
– comes from China, where transitional, unorthodox, informal 
relations between investors and local government officials effectively 
substituted for more formal property rights in the early stages of 
market-led growth, in quite unexpected ways (Qian 2003). It seems 
very unlikely that conventional governance or political economy 
analysis aimed at improving the investment climate would have picked 
up on these informal but deeply influential relationships. 
 · A less familiar but very topical example comes from Afghanistan. 
Recent research shows how supply-driven approaches to state building 
and development led donors to overlook very local customary village-
level organisations that provide a range of public goods including local 
security and dispute resolution. The National Solidarity Programme 
largely ignored these informal arrangements and instead created over 
18,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs), complete with 
social organisers to mobilise community participation and facilitate the 
delivery of donor-funded projects. The CDCs have provided funds for 
badly needed infrastructure, but are not accountable to villagers. The 
research found that in many instances they had a negative impact on 
the provision of public goods (such as dispute resolution) by customary 
village organisations, and could disrupt local patterns of decision-
making and cooperation. There is potential for productive cooperation 
between externally funded programmes and customary organisations, 
but the latter can be undermined by state-building interventions that 
fail to take account of them (Brick 2008).
1.3 Centre for the Future State: framing the research
The CFS research has been framed in response to the following.
i) A belief that effective, accountable public authority matters for 
development. The approach is not ‘anti-state’ or ‘governance-sceptic’. 
But equally, in company with many other scholars, the research 
questions the primacy accorded by ‘institutionalists’ to a specific set of 
formal arrangements (for example laws to protect property rights, or 
enforce contracts).
ii) Building effective, accountable formal institutions in poor countries 
has proved much harder than many people expected. Experience 
suggests that ‘skipping straight to Weber’ will not work. Practitioners 
need alternatives. It therefore seems worth investigating whether 
an UPs IDe  DoWn v I eW of  governance
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transitional arrangements that build on existing interests and 
relationships might offer a better way forward than strategies that 
seek to disrupt or change them in preconceived ways.
iii) There is huge diversity between and within poor countries in the 
global South, and multiple possible paths towards creating effective 
public authority. This underlines the need to focus on the function not 
the form of institutions, to be open to novel arrangements and 
unexpected outcomes, and to look for ways of better understanding 
and explaining diversity.
iv) The world has changed significantly in the last 30 years, reshaping 
both the global environment for poor countries, and state-level 
structures. Decentralisation, privatisation, democratisation, citizen 
participation, the increasing involvement of non-state actors in service 
provision, public-private partnerships – all these have created new 
challenges. Traditional Weberian ideas about state capacity look out of 
date, even for OECD states. They can no longer rely on hierarchical, 
‘command and control’ approaches; instead they need the capacity to 
manage multiple linkages and networks that cross the public-private 
divide (Ansell 2000).
Moving away from the security of Western state models can be 
destabilising for policymakers. The CFS research does not offer clear 
alternative models, or a menu of policy options (which need to be 
context-specific). But – returning to our metaphor of the struggling artist 
– it does offer two main kinds of help. 
i) It sets aside preconceptions that distort the policymaker’s view of the 
world, and can get in the way of seeing what is actually there. One 
very practical starting point (equivalent to turning the picture upside 
down) is to change or challenge the language we use.
ii) It offers some new drawing skills: some working hypotheses, some 
ways of thinking about development challenges, some questions to 
ask, some angles to explore – all of which can help better identify the 
underlying causes of development problems, and the scope for finding 
common interests in addressing them. 
In short, the CFS research is deeply interested in progressive outcomes. 
But it is open to unorthodox ideas about how these might come about. 
The argument is not that states do not matter. But they do not need to do 
everything. Moreover, while building more formal, rules-based 
democratic governance is a valid long-term goal, focusing exclusively on 
that may not offer effective strategies for helping poor countries with very 
weak institutions to improve security, encourage investment or deliver 
public services in the short-to-medium term. 
There is 
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1.4 Watch your language 
A standard vocabulary has emerged among donors for discussing 
governance issues, and this can be unhelpful. Scrutinising it more 
carefully can help challenge unexamined assumptions, false dichotomies 
and ideological biases that get in the way of seeing ‘what is actually 
there’. The following examples illustrate the kind of changes in language 
that have proved useful in framing the CFS research. They are not 
intended to be exhaustive.
 · Instead of ‘state building’ and ‘state capacity’, think about ‘public 
authority’. ‘State building’ tends to evoke the historical experience of 
Western countries, notably France and Germany in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. We prefer to talk about creating ‘public authority’, 
i.e. institutions (both formal and informal) that can undertake core 
governance functions: protection from external threats, and managing 
external relations; peaceful resolution of internal conflicts; and 
providing or facilitating the provision of a range of collective goods and 
services. The terms ‘state building’ and ‘state capacity’ can be unhelpful 
for the following reasons. 
 – They imply a sequence of steps2 leading to the creation of a set of 
formal institutions resembling those of a Western, Weberian state 
(monopoly of violence, a rules-based bureaucracy and representative 
institutions, and clear distinctions between public and private 
spheres). It is unrealistic to look for the recreation of these ‘ideal’ 
models in many poor countries in the short-to-medium term.
 – Moreover, as noted above, the model itself may no longer be so 
relevant. Governments today have to negotiate with a much greater 
diversity of actors, including: an expanded private sector with 
transnational links; diverse political parties and movements; sub-
national governments; armed opposition groups; and a proliferation 
of multilateral and bilateral donors, and national and international 
NGOs. This implies a different set of state ‘capacities’, with more 
emphasis on influencing, networking and regulating other actors 
than on traditional, top-down capacity to formulate and implement 
policy.
 – States are not the only sources of public authority. In most poor 
countries the boundaries between ‘state’ and ‘society’ are unclear, 
and the task of organising collective action to create public goods 
2  Some concept of sequencing is helpful, starting with the creation of institutions to control a 
given territory that are superordinate to other institutions claiming to exercise public authority, 
and the establishment of institutions of rule that depend less on coercion and force, and more 
on legitimacy, consent and negotiation. Progress in accomplishing these earlier tasks creates the 
conditions under which institutional arrangements to create a range of other public goods can 
be developed. However, the idea of any kind of rigid sequencing or state-building model is 
unhelpful.
Instead of 
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may be shared between a great variety of state and non-state actors.
 – ‘State building’ can evoke strong ideological biases that distort the 
picture. Some people, for example, emphasise the need for effective 
authority to aggregate power and resources and provide order and 
security; others are more inclined to see state power as a threat to 
citizens, and emphasise the need for legal and constitutional 
arrangements to limit state power.
 – ‘State building’ has come to be associated with externally driven 
processes, and ‘state capacity’ with donor-led programmes of 
financial support and technical assistance. 
In short, ‘public authority’ focuses on functions rather than on form, and 
is more neutral about the processes and actors involved – inside or 
outside the formal state, and across the public-private divide. 
 · Instead of ‘political will’ think about the institutional incentives that 
drive the actions of political and economic elites. The term ‘political 
will’ is often used in a catch-all sense to avoid unpacking the complex 
factors at work in shaping a policy response. It can also encourage 
donors to pin their hopes on individual reform ‘champions’. While 
individuals clearly make a very important difference, they come and go 
– so it may be more useful to think in terms of the structures and 
institutions shaping their interests, and those of other elite groups. 
 · The term ‘vested (elite) interests’ is often used in a pejorative sense to 
imply venal or dishonest/selfish, leading to assumptions that such 
interests should be opposed (for example by creating a reform 
coalition). But elites are central to creating effective public authority, so 
it may be more helpful to think about the potential for their interests to 
overlap with a progressive agenda, or about more indirect strategies 
that could help shift their interests over time. These ideas are explored 
further in CFS work on the underlying causes of state fragility  
(Chapter 2). 
 · Instead of lionising civil society, think about state-society interaction. 
This helps to avoid the assumption that ‘strengthening’ civil society is 
always worthwhile: whether this is so depends on whose interests are 
being strengthened, and on the context. Stimulating collective action 
without considering the capacity of the state to negotiate and respond 
can lead to demand overload, or policy fragmentation. Sustaining 
effective ongoing collective action requires an adequate state response.  
 
A focus on state-society interaction underlines the need to look at both 
sides of the relationship, and avoids an over-simple dichotomy between 
the ‘supply’ and ‘demand’ sides of governance. It emphasises the way in 
which state and society can help build each other: bargaining between 
state and society actors is critical to stimulating collective action, 
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aggregating and channelling demands, identifying common interests, 
and enabling the state to build consensus and respond effectively. 
 · Instead of prioritising formal institutions and equating informal 
institutions3 with corrupt or collusive practices, take more account of how 
the two interact. For example, CFS research (Chapter 3) suggests that 
relations between public policymakers and private investors that are 
initially personal and exclusive can provide ‘proxy’ governance measures 
to encourage investment in the short-to-medium term.  
 
In exploring ‘informality’ the research seeks to avoid ideological positions. 
Informality is just a fact of life. ‘Informal’ is not equated with ‘traditional’ 
which can itself be unhelpful terminology if used to imply ‘unchanging’, 
and which tends to evoke strong pro or anti biases. Despite the CFS 
preoccupation with informality, there is no implied bias, either in favour or 
against ‘working with the grain’ of informal institutions. These need first to 
be understood within a specific context, and then evaluated for positive 
and negative consequences.
 · More generally, it seems useful to avoid (1) general-purpose labels that blur 
important distinctions, and (2) value-laden language that embodies 
unexamined assumptions. An example of the first is ‘(neo)patrimonialism’, 
often used in juxtaposition to rules-based, rational-legal systems of 
authority, and sometimes as a synonym for corruption or bad governance 
(Pitcher et al. 2009). People who use the term in this way miss an 
important aspect of patrimonialism as originally conceived by Max Weber, 
namely the existence of reciprocal relations between rulers and ruled. This 
is not just an academic quibble: labels can pre-empt a more discerning 
inquiry into the circumstances in which patrimonialism may be compatible 
with progressive change. 
 
The second point – the need to avoid value-laden language – is probably 
more obvious. Democratic governance, rights, and rule of law are 
conventionally seen as both morally good and beneficial. Such associations 
can inhibit investigation of the very challenging processes involved in 
creating them. The words also imply a specific form as well as a function, 
which can get in the way of more open inquiry. For example, rather than 
thinking of political representation only in terms of democratic elections, 
the CFS research examines more unorthodox ways in which representative 
governance may be emerging in unlikely circumstances, including informal 
customary village councils in Karnataka, India (Chapter 5), and 
participatory governance structures in São Paulo, Brazil (Chapter 4).
3  By informal institutions, we understand ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
created, communicated and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004).
Informality 
is just a fact of 
life.
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1.5 New drawing skills for policymakers
Having metaphorically turned the picture upside down, what new 
drawing skills can the research offer?
The first is a core theoretical insight that underpins both phases of the 
CFS research. It is widely accepted among political scientists but until 
recently has been unfamiliar to many development practitioners.4 It is 
that the causes of and solutions to poor governance lie principally in 
patterns of state-society relations. Progress in creating effective, 
accountable public authority comes from bargaining among social groups 
and between social groups and the state. This can produce exclusive 
benefits for a privileged few, and low levels of public goods. But it can 
also lead to a broader range of public goods and more inclusive benefits. 
The Phase 1 research put it this way:
Historically this [bargaining]... has often involved violent conflict, but 
it can also produce positive sum outcomes, if the parties involved can 
identify common interests and negotiate arrangements to pursue 
them. Over time this may lead to more civic ways of managing 
competing interests, and result in the creation of legitimate, stable 
institutions: arrangements which are valued – and thus become 
institutionalised – because they are seen to serve a common purpose. 
(IDS 2005)
Building effective, accountable public authority requires striking a 
balance between the need for states to have ‘autonomy’, and the need for 
them to be ‘embedded’ in society (Evans 1995). States need coercive 
power to impose basic order – but they also need ‘buy-in’ from societal 
actors to provide the legitimacy that transforms raw power into less 
coercive political authority. States need bureaucratic capacity to raise 
revenue and organise public goods, including security and dispute 
resolution – but they also need compliance and collective action by 
societal groups so that individual interests can be aggregated, common 
demands can be formulated, and policymakers can obtain the 
information and support they need to design and implement good public 
policy. Elements of public authority are also created outside the state, for 
example through self-regulation by private businesses to resolve disputes 
and enforce contracts, or when customary village councils organise the 
provision of public goods.
In summary, effective, accountable formal institutions evolve through 
complex, long-term interaction between state and society, public and 
4  This is now starting to change with increasing attention to the political dynamics of state 
building in fragile situations, for example by the OECD/DAC International Network on 
Conflict and Fragility (OECD/DAC 2008, 2010).
The causes 
of and solutions 
to poor 
governance lie 
principally in 
patterns of 
state-society 
relations.
13
CHApTER  1  a  f resh  look  at  governance
private actors, formal and informal institutions. So the first critical 
drawing skill is for policymakers to switch their attention away from 
formal institutions (the destination), towards mapping and understanding 
those complex interactions.
The problem for policymakers is how to link big theoretical insights of 
this kind to short-term practice. It is often easier to see how dysfunctional 
relations and informal arrangements cause governance problems than it is 
to find ways of fixing them. The CFS research reveals enormous diversity 
of contexts and circumstances that shape different outcomes: it is 
therefore very hard to detect broad patterns that could have policy 
implications (and researchers have been alert to the risks of drawing 
unwarranted generalisations from particular cases).
However, the research does provide a basis for moving beyond the broad 
proposition that informal institutions and relationships matter, and offers 
practitioners a way of starting to investigate the very messy, complex 
reality that confronts them. Drawing on and adding to the insights of 
other scholars, the research offers help in four main ways.
i) It points to some factors and relationships that seem particularly 
salient, and suggests some questions to ask that are relevant in a great 
variety of contexts. What is shaping the interests of political elites? 
(Sources of revenue are likely to be critical.) What is shaping relations 
between politicians and investors, and might they have common 
interests in supporting productive investment? What might stimulate 
and sustain collective action by social groups to demand better 
services? What informal local institutions are at work, and how are 
they shaping development outcomes? Are they supporting or 
undermining formal public authority? Where does government get its 
revenue from, and how is this shaping its relations with citizens?
ii) Large-scale comparative surveys – for example the research into 
informal village-level institutions in South Asia (Chapter 5) – can 
suggest explanations of diverse outcomes that may have wider 
relevance (in this case, linking them to the origins of informal 
institutions in different patterns of colonial rule). Smaller-scale 
comparative studies can suggest new hypotheses for future research – 
for example into state-business relations (Chapter 3).
iii) Individual case studies provide evidence of exactly why and how 
informal processes and relationships can derail well-intentioned policy 
reforms, or conversely can offer insights into factors that contributed 
to successful reform (Chapter 4). These cases do not offer examples 
that can be replicated, but they do stimulate questions and fresh ways 
of thinking about development issues that are relevant across a range 
of different contexts.
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iv) Many of the findings have proved of direct interest to local 
policymakers. For example, research into informal village-level 
governance in Pakistani Punjab has been taken up by officials in the 
provincial planning department; research into collective action around 
service delivery has attracted the attention of local authorities in São 
Paulo and Delhi.
Essentially, good ‘drawing skills’ consist of asking useful questions, 
directed towards understanding the underlying, informal processes that 
could encourage or inhibit constructive relationships and bargaining 
between key actors. The CFS research helps to identify, fine tune and 
validate such questions.
More broadly, as explained in Chapter 7, the research points to a 
different aid model. It shifts attention away from donor-driven reform 
initiatives, and towards local capacity and incentives to address core 
development problems. This suggests doing much more to empower local 
policymakers (including through good-quality research), while looking 
for indirect ways in which external actors could help create a better 
enabling environment. This might include action to limit the damaging 
impact of OECD governments and businesses on local incentives and 
capacity for progressive change, and helping to convene and manage 
partnerships between multiple stakeholders, including public and private 
actors, North and South.
1.6 Outline of the chapters
Chapters 2–6 below set out the core findings from the research.
Chapter 2 looks at the factors shaping the global environment within 
which poor countries in the South are struggling to create effective public 
authority. It explains how changes in the global economy have provided 
exceptional incentives for political elites in poor countries not to create 
effective states and public institutions, resulting in distinctive patterns of 
persistent conflict, and state fragility. It explores effective policy responses 
that might shift the institutional incentives driving elite behaviour.
Chapter 3 explains why relations between holders of political power and 
holders of economic power are so central to the process of creating 
effective and accountable public authority, and why conventional 
approaches to improving the investment climate have had limited impact 
in poor countries. Case studies in Egypt, Indonesia and China explore the 
potential for informal relationships between politicians, policymakers and 
private investors to compensate for weak formal governance 
arrangements, and to boost investment in the short-to-medium term. 
Findings from Egypt suggest that these played a critical role in unleashing 
the profit potential of specific industrial sectors, thus leading to higher 
investment than in other sectors with less potential. 
Good 
‘drawing skills’ 
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Chapter 4 explores the circumstances in which poor people, or collective 
actors working on their behalf, can be effective in demanding 
accountability and improved performance from service providers. Based 
on a cross-country comparative study of reforms of healthcare and social 
assistance programmes in São Paulo, Brazil and Delhi, India, it finds that 
different types of public sector reform can substantially influence 
opportunities for collective actors, as can involvement at critical stages of 
policy reform. It also explores new forms of representation emerging 
among collective actors in São Paulo.
Chapter 5 raises the question of how to view so-called ‘traditional’ 
institutions: are they part of the governance problem, or part of the 
solution? The CFS has undertaken extensive research into informal local 
governance institutions in Karnataka, Rajasthan and Pakistani Punjab. It 
finds that they remain surprisingly influential and diverse, and interact in 
significant ways with formal institutions. In Karnataka, customary village 
councils are adapting to a more competitive democratic environment, are 
becoming more representative and pluralist, and interacting synergistically 
with formal institutions. By contrast, in Pakistani Punjab informal local 
governance institutions remain hierarchical with authority concentrated 
in landowning families and kinship groups. These differences can be 
related to whether such institutions had their origins in indirect or direct 
systems of colonial rule, as well as to more contemporary factors. These 
different origins help to explain persistent differences in the quality of 
development outcomes between neighbouring villages, and offer some 
practical ways of starting to improve the targeting of public programmes. 
Chapter 6 picks up on a major theme of the Phase 1 research, namely the 
links between taxation and accountability. Detailed studies cover the 
political economy of taxation and its relationship to accountability in 
Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia. Findings from all three countries show clear 
evidence of a broad causal relationship linking government reliance on 
taxation with pressures for increased accountability and responsiveness. 
They also reveal some more specific processes at work, including direct 
tax bargaining leading to specific episodes of political reform, and more 
indirect pressures for change driven by citizen resistance to taxation. This 
chapter also picks up on the implications for governance of natural 
resource revenues. A case study from Peru shows how huge increases in 
natural resource revenues fuelled dysfunctional relations between local 
governments, mining companies and activist movements, resulting in 
conflict and poor governance. It provides a clear warning that standard 
remedies can backfire when they take insufficient account of local context 
and political dynamics.
Chapter 7 examines the operational implications of these findings for 
local policymakers, international donors and the current aid and 
development model.
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2.1 Introduction
This strand of the CFS research applies the lens of state-society relations to 
exploring the causes of conflict and state fragility in very poor countries of the 
global South.
Western policymakers have become increasingly preoccupied with the 
challenges posed by weak or ‘failing’/‘fragile’ states – states where no group or 
party has been able to establish effective control over the territory and provide 
security and basic services and where weak governance and continuous 
internal conflict have become routine. In thinking about the reasons for state 
fragility, policymakers often cite historical or structural factors, including 
colonial legacies of artificial boundaries and institutions that lack local 
legitimacy. These are valid parts of the explanation but are not very amenable 
to policy interventions. More often policymakers point to weak institutions 
and high levels of corruption as critical features of fragile states that need to 
be ‘addressed’. But finding effective strategies has proved elusive.
State-society relations 
and state fragility2
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2.2 Perverse incentives for elites 
The CFS research suggests that a critical underlying cause of state 
fragility is the lack of elite incentives to create effective public 
authority. A major reason is that the global environment has 
provided unprecedented opportunities for elites with transnational 
connections to profit from weak governance and ongoing conflict. 
Effective policy interventions therefore need to focus on ways of 
shifting these perverse incentives.
The core problem of states that lack effective public authority is 
widespread, has almost certainly worsened in recent years (in the 
sense of affecting an increasing number of people), and in some 
places is becoming normalised. Governments in Somalia, Sudan, 
Haiti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Central African 
Republic, Guinea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola 
and Chad among others have suffered significant, apparently long-
term shrinkage of authority and capacity. Actual power has shifted 
to unofficial, non-state actors, often financed by criminal or resource 
extraction activities, and reliant on nonofficial armed force. 
Historically, following war, conquest or revolution, one party has 
emerged dominant, or public authority has been re-established 
through compromise between leading contenders. A distinctive 
feature of the current fragile state phenomenon is the absence or 
slowness of such processes. Failing governments have not been 
ousted militarily and the international consensus – supported by the 
UN and African Union – against changing international boundaries 
by force has reduced the chances of this happening. Weak 
governance and continuous internal conflict have become routine.
The end of the Cold War was the immediate trigger for so many cases 
of state weakness and failure. But a combination of globalisation, 
and big increases in wealth and income inequality between rich and 
poor countries, are also driving the process. Changes in the global 
economy from the 1970s onwards, spurred by the reduction in costs 
of long-distance transport and communications, have had a 
fundamental impact on elite incentives in poor countries. In the list 
that follows, the first two are the most important.
A critical 
underlying 
cause of state 
fragility is the 
lack of elite 
incentives to 
create effective 
public authority.
Key findings
 · The global environment creates perverse incentives for political 
elites to perpetuate fragile states because it gives them access to 
unearned sources of income from natural resource rents and 
criminal activities. 
This weakens their incentives to engage with citizens, build public 
institutions and nurture the economy.  
(Moore et al. 2009) 
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i) Elites with political and military power face huge financial incentives 
to enrich themselves by: gaining control of rents from the export to 
much richer countries of oil, minerals and natural gas; smuggling 
diamonds and other mining products; and illegal trade in narcotics. 
(The latter has particularly corrupting effects on officials and 
politicians in transhipment areas).
ii) Global financial liberalisation has made it increasingly easy to transfer 
large financial assets abroad, and to store them in tax havens with 
(until recently) very few questions asked.
iii) Elites can protect themselves at home by hiring military force on 
global commercial markets, thus relieving them of the need to organise 
local manpower and to build the political legitimacy and 
administrative capacity to support a domestic military capability.
iv) Where public institutions are already weak, they can be further 
undermined by high aid inflows. These can reduce incentives to 
increase economic growth in order to expand public revenue, and 
weaken the need to bargain with citizen taxpayers. More specifically, 
international humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced 
persons can provide valuable resources to armed groups, and thus 
incentives to leave military and political conflicts unresolved.
v) The globalisation of arms production is an exacerbating factor, 
widening loopholes in regulatory systems to control the international 
arms trade.
All of these factors have weakened elite incentives to create effective 
public institutions, to nurture the economy and to invest in public 
services. Elites include people with formal power (businessmen, 
politicians, wealthy professionals or religious leaders) but also people 
with informal power (as warlords, or leaders of narcotics or other 
criminal networks). They matter because it is elites – people with high 
levels of political, bureaucratic, military, financial and economic power 
– who can make crucial policy choices to support or undermine public 
authority.
2.3 Scope for international action
Globalisation itself is not the culprit, and indeed has some positive 
effects. The close contemporary interaction between very rich and very 
poor countries has brought strong pressures for more democratic, rules-
based governance. It has contributed to public awareness of global 
challenges – an obvious example being climate change – that in turn 
creates reputational pressure on business and governments. It supports 
the organisational power of international NGOs to mobilise action and 
an UPs IDe  DoWn v I eW of  governance
20
public opinion, and offers new opportunities for communities of experts 
to share experience, facilitate learning and coordinate action. 
Transnational corporations can play a useful role as vehicles for 
introducing more effective and transparent systems of accountancy, 
commercial law and corporate governance. There is a growing role for 
multi-stakeholder partnerships that bring together governments, business 
and local and international civil society to tackle global issues including 
trade, the environment, human rights, crime prevention, security and 
medicine.
In particular there is scope for international action to address a range of 
issues that are central to changing the perverse incentives described 
above. Some are already well advanced, including action on international 
tax evasion, money laundering, stolen asset recovery, corruption and 
terrorist financing. A range of multi-stakeholder initiatives are also 
ongoing (with mixed results), designed to mitigate the negative impact of 
natural resource revenues. They include the Kimberley process to prevent 
trading in conflict diamonds; the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) to encourage transparency about revenues paid by oil 
companies to producer governments; and international action to control 
illegal logging. There is scope to make all these work better. One of the 
most significant gaps is the failure to reform the international regulation 
of narcotics, although political support for change may be growing. 
Meanwhile new challenges are in prospect: an example is the proposal for 
a mechanism under the post-Kyoto climate regime to pay compensation 
to countries for ‘avoided deforestation’, thus motivating them to protect 
tropical forests (the so-called REDD initiative – Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and forest Degradation). Depending on how the 
mechanisms are designed, such revenues might add to the problems of 
perverse incentives currently associated with large incomes from oil, gas 
and minerals.
2.4 Conclusions and policy messages
There are some broad implications of these findings for policymakers, 
notably the way changes in the global environment are transforming aid 
relationships. These are examined in more detail in Chapter 7 below. The 
main point here is that applying a different lens to thinking about state 
fragility points to a change in strategy: less of a focus on direct action to 
build formal institutions, eliminate corruption or supply external sources 
of security; and much more of a focus on action to address the sources of 
perverse incentives that undermine elite interests in building effective 
public authority. Given how difficult it is for outsiders directly to 
influence internal political dynamics in poor countries, they should do 
much more to address aspects of their own behaviour that have a 
damaging impact, and prioritise action that can be initiated and managed 
by OECD countries.
Applying a 
different lens to 
thinking about 
state fragility 
points to a 
change in 
strategy.
21
CHApTER  3  hoW can PUbl Ic  act Ion st ImUlate  ProDUct Ive  Pr I vate  Investment?
3.1 Introduction
For years, developing countries have been on the receiving end of well-
intentioned advice from international donors about how to increase 
economic growth. As is often the case, the prescriptions have fluctuated 
widely according to prevalent donor fashions: enthusiasm for state-led 
development gave way to urgent advocacy of liberalisation, privatisation 
and retrenchment of government, followed by a rediscovery that public 
institutions matter for growth. This was accompanied by a stream of 
advice about how to improve the investment climate by strengthening 
legal arrangements to protect property rights, facilitate contract 
enforcement and improve regulation (with an emphasis on reducing the 
role of government in decision-making) (World Bank 2005). The problem 
with this approach is that (1) reforms have proved very difficult to 
implement in poor countries with weak institutions; and (2) it now seems 
clear that they may do little on their own to improve prospects for growth. 
China in particular – but also Vietnam – have achieved astonishing growth 
without many of these formal, legal arrangements in place. 
So a rethink is underway, stimulated by the work of Dani Rodrik among 
others (Rodrik 2005). It is increasingly accepted by development 
practitioners that comprehensive, best-practice reforms of public sector 
institutions have had limited impact. There is some recognition that what 
matters is the function, rather than the form of institutions: while certain 
How can public action 
stimulate productive 
private investment?
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high-level principles (protection of property rights, rule of law, market-
oriented incentives, sound money, sustainable public finances) all matter 
for growth, they can be delivered in different ways, allowing for more 
country-specific variation and experimentation. More recently the World 
Bank and DFID among others have taken an interest in bringing together 
political economy analysis with growth diagnostic frameworks to identify 
the ‘binding constraints’ to growth in particular contexts, and to identify 
targeted, politically feasible solutions. 
Much of this rethink is positive, and the CFS research programme into 
ways of stimulating productive private investment through public action 
builds on the insights of Rodrik and others. But donor thinking – even 
when directed towards more politically sensitive, targeted approaches – is 
still heavily coloured by the experience of OECD countries. This is 
unhelpful in two main ways.
i) It significantly underplays the importance, in poor countries, of the 
relationship between people who control political/military power and 
those who control economic power. This relationship is fundamental 
to creating and sustaining public order. 
ii) It limits the menu of options because – despite acknowledging the 
need for some local experimentation – donors still tend to look for 
solutions based on formal rules that have (mostly) worked well in 
OECD environments. This underplays the potential for very informal 
relations to support productive private investment, through deals 
struck between politicians and investors, and through ‘self-help’ 
arrangements between business people (to arbitrate disputes and share 
information about credit-worthiness, for example – with reputational 
risk as a sanction).
The CFS research seeks to reframe the debate about how to stimulate 
productive private investment in poor countries by looking at relationship-
based rather than rules-based approaches (Moore and Schmitz 2008). 
While rules-based arrangements remain a valid long-term goal, experience 
suggests that these are very difficult to implement and may be ill suited to 
helping poor countries with weak institutions to increase investment in the 
short-to-medium term. There are of course legitimate concerns that 
informal relationships often result in monopoly, privilege and corruption 
(so-called ‘crony capitalism’). But it is unhelpful to slap this label on all 
informal arrangements between government and business without a closer 
examination of how they actually work out in practice.
3.2 Interdependence between politicians and           
      business
People who hold political/military power and people who hold economic 
power need each other and stand to benefit from cooperation; but they 
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also face considerable risks in doing so. Politicians need private capital to 
provide state revenue, finance political parties and invest to create 
prosperity that supports political order. Holders of private capital need 
public authority to provide security and public order, physical and 
financial infrastructure, and credible assurances that they will be able to 
retain the profits from their investments.
But in practice in poor countries the relationship is often fraught and 
competitive. Politicians are tempted to predate on private capital (legally 
through heavy taxation or illegally by confiscating assets or extracting 
protection money). Holders of capital may use their economic power to 
organise violent opposition or extract exclusive benefits through 
monopolies and restrictions on competition. Public authority and private 
capital are often fragmented and lack organisational capacity, which 
makes productive cooperation more difficult. Moreover, as seen in 
Chapter 2 above, politicians may have limited need for bargaining with 
private capital if they have alternative sources of revenue.
By contrast, in OECD countries, competition between public authority 
and private capital takes place primarily within widely accepted formal 
rules, and relationships are relatively indirect and impersonal. 
Governments depend on general taxation for revenue, which depends on 
economic growth. This makes it essential to negotiate with private 
capital, which can use its structural power to withhold or slow down 
investment if dissatisfied with government policy. Electoral democracy 
and high levels of welfare spending give governments legitimacy and 
capacity to bargain effectively with private capital. It is relatively easy to 
build political coalitions based on common interests between major 
economic and political actors, and to formulate economic policies to 
support growth. In short, institutions of market capitalism, liberal 
democracy and welfare states are mutually reinforcing.
But these arrangements are the product of a long history of political 
conflict and socioeconomic change, and cannot easily be replicated. 
Advice about how to ‘improve’ the investment climate based on an 
OECD model is likely to be inappropriate and potentially damaging, 
because it significantly underestimates the fundamental challenge of 
negotiating a bargain between politicians and business.  
If building best-practice institutions in poor countries is not a short-term 
option, and if relationships between private investors and public 
authority are likely to remain highly personalised and informal in the 
medium term, the question becomes in what circumstances might such 
relationships lead to productive investment rather than crony capitalism? 
That is the issue addressed by this stream of the CFS research.
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3.3 Relationship-based investment
Conventional thinking about the investment climate conflates two distinct 
ideas about things that governments can do to improve the environment 
for business investors. They can:
 · reduce the costs of doing business, including the availability, reliability 
and cost of public infrastructure and skilled labour, the costs of 
complying with government regulations, and the burden of heavy 
taxation;
 · reduce the risks of doing business – i.e. the degree of uncertainty faced 
by investors about their ability to profit in future from investment 
decisions made now. Particular problems of uncertainty arise from poor 
governance, including arbitrary taxation, inability to enforce contracts, 
and lack of government protection against theft.
The CFS research focuses on the risks of doing business, and especially 
the reality or perception of risks that arise from relationships between 
business and those who hold political power.
Clearly context matters, because it fundamentally affects the interests of 
economic and political elites, and therefore the way the relationship 
between them plays out. At the macro level, Chapter 2 above highlighted 
how recent changes in the global environment have undermined elite 
incentives to nurture economic growth or improve governance. The 
structure of the domestic economy is also significant: mineral or fuel 
wealth invites looting because it generates high levels of surplus that are 
easy to control. By contrast, governments dependent on revenue from 
specialist export enterprises with the freedom to move elsewhere will 
have a strong interest in providing them with support and protection. 
Formal institutions matter: decentralisation can create space and 
incentives for bargaining between officials and business at a sub-national 
level, and between different levels of government. The CFS research 
attempts to hold constant at least some contextual factors by looking at 
variations in investment performance between sectors or regions within a 
single country, to explore how far relatively short-term relationships 
between politicians and investors – often of a transitional kind – played a 
part in explaining different outcomes. 
These relationships are not highly visible and are often deliberately 
covert, and therefore difficult to research. However, their potential 
importance is illustrated by a number of cases that have provided the 
inspiration for the CFS research. One already mentioned is China, where 
informal relations provided investors with confidence that they could 
retain their profits despite very weak legal protection of property rights 
(Qian 2003). Many of the same factors explain significant economic 
growth in Vietnam despite weak formal legal protection of property 
rights. A different but equally striking case comes from the experience of 
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Mexico where some sectors of the economy thrived during a long period 
of political instability and civil war between 1876–1929, based on very 
local bargains between politicians and business (Haber et al. 2003).
The CFS research programme has built on such insights, undertaking 
detailed investigation of the way relations between public actors and 
private investors have influenced investment outcomes at the national 
level in Egypt, and at local level in Indonesia and China. The following 
section gives highlights from the cases.
3.4 Detailed findings
Egypt: Common interests in productive investment
Egypt has generally been perceived as having a poor investment climate at 
the national level. For most of the last three decades it has recorded 
declining levels of investment and growth. This is despite carrying out 
significant legal reforms to end expropriation and give equal treatment to 
local and foreign firms, as well as structural adjustment measures and 
intellectual property and labour laws.
However, there has been significant improvement in overall levels of 
private investment since 2004, with especially strong increases in 
particular sectors including food and communications. This coincided 
with a change of government in 2004, and the appointment of 
businessmen to ministerial positions for the first time since 1952. The 
government introduced a number of important regulatory changes, long 
demanded by the business community, including simplification of customs 
and taxation.
It seems unlikely, however, that these legal and regulatory changes go very 
far in explaining the increase in investment, given the failure of such 
changes in the preceding 30 years to have much impact. Moreover, 
formal changes do not explain why some sectors (notably 
communications) saw a significant increase in investment from the late 
1990s, why investment after 2004 was so much higher in some sectors 
than in others, or how important remaining constraints in the ‘investment 
Key findings
 · A new government in 2004 triggered positive changes in relations 
between officials and business.
 · A common understanding of problems and common interests in 
addressing them facilitated targeted solutions that boosted 
investment in sectors with good profit potential.
 · These relations were initially informal and exclusive, but became 
more institutionalised and inclusive over time. 
(Abdel-Latif and Schmitz 2009)
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climate’ were overcome, including inconsistent legislation and weak 
contract enforcement.
The CFS research explored whether, and if so how far, informal relations 
between policymakers and private investors played a role (alongside 
regulatory and other changes) in increasing the levels of productive 
private investment. It looked at two long-established, traditional sectors 
– food and furniture – that showed different investment trends: a sharp 
increase in investment in the food industry, but only in one sub-sector of 
the furniture industry. It also looked at two newer sectors – 
communications and IT: both started development in the mid-1980s but 
took different paths, with the communications industry growing much 
more rapidly.
The research was based on statistical data and 61 key informant 
interviews with government and business leaders. It traced in detail the 
development of informal relations between them, from initial contacts 
(often rooted in prior social or professional relationships), through 
building a common understanding of problems and interest in addressing 
them, to the development (first informally, later publicly) of sector-specific 
policy measures. In some cases these resulted in a ‘tipping point’ when 
investment started responding, and there were knock-on effects as local 
investment pulled in foreign direct investment, and confidence spread to 
other sectors.
Overall the research found that the most critical change that occurred in 
2004 was not so much in improved government regulation, as in changes 
in perceptions and attitudes. However, informal relations between 
policymakers and investors became effective only when there was a 
common understanding of the problems and a common interest in 
addressing them. This provided space to find sector-specific solutions, 
thus reducing obstacles and risks for investors and increasing their chance 
of reaping a profit, while enhancing the reputation of policymakers 
associated with boosting growth and job creation. Such mutual interests 
were particularly clear in the food sector (which contributed to industrial 
output, employment and exports). They were less evident in the furniture 
sector, although investment was high in one sub-sector that was focused 
on exports. In the communications and IT sectors the big companies were 
willing to invest because they saw the gains to be reaped from being first 
movers in new markets. Policymakers negotiated deals with these 
companies because they saw the potential of the new technologies and 
welcomed the prestige that came from being associated with the new 
industries. A shared professional background facilitated understanding 
and cooperation between the two sides. 
The most 
critical change 
was not so much 
in improved 
government 
regulation, as in 
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Other findings of interest include the following.
 · Informal state-business relationships were not the sole direct cause of 
an increase in private investment, but played a critical role in 
unleashing the profit potential of specific sectors. They can unblock the 
way forward in the short-to-medium term in cases where governance is 
weak. In the food sector, for example, the direct reason for the increase 
in investment was favourable demand, but informal relationships 
played an important part in overcoming general supply constraints and 
facilitating effective investments.
 · Informal state-business relations operated by providing a broad level of 
trust and credibility in government, and by offering proxy governance 
benefits through policy changes of particular relevance to a sector or 
sub-sector. They facilitated difficult, politically sensitive decision-
making, for example the removal of restrictions on access of big 
investors in the food sector to reclaimed desert land, and the removal of 
the energy subsidy. In particular, informal relations played a critical role 
in helping to establish the communication and IT industries virtually 
from scratch, overcoming initial barriers to entry and helping to 
surmount institutional deficiencies and lack of experience. Early 
investors were able to make a major contribution to drafting the new 
telecommunications law.
 · In both the old and new sectors, the close alliance between high-level 
policymakers and big investors extended into the Cabinet, and in the 
case of the communications and IT industries, up to the President. This 
helps to explain why a willingness to take action translated into a 
capability to take action.
 · Although informal state-business relations initially offer exclusive 
benefits, they can have a subsequent inclusive and positive impact, but 
only where the private sector has effective leadership and broad-based 
organisation (this applied, for example, to the food sector, but not to 
most of the furniture sector). And while initial interactions are 
informal, they can become institutionalised over time.
 · Although effective state-business relations are often rooted in informal 
social or professional relationships, these are not a precondition for the 
development of common understanding of problems and common 
interests in resolving them.
 · Finally, it is hard to establish whether informal state-business relations 
had a temporary effect, or were more enduring. The answer is clearest 
in the case of the communications and IT sectors, where a new industry 
was established. A tentative assessment is that the communications 
industry and the export-dominated sub-sector of the furniture industry 
had embarked on a new dynamic: the jury is still out on the IT industry 
and the food industry. What is clear is that informal state-business 
relations have provided an effective transitional arrangement in 
initiating investment and growth. The broader political and economic 
context in Egypt was significant in helping to ensure that exclusive 
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benefits were targeted on sectors with the potential for productive 
investment, and that the more negative effects of ‘crony’ relationships 
were avoided. Ministers had incentives to deliver on a range of public 
goods, and were subject to media scrutiny.
Indonesia: A tale of two cities
Another strand of the research also challenges the conventional wisdom 
that impartial, rules-based economic governance is a precondition for 
investment. A study of the political economy of two cities in Indonesia 
shows that relationship-based, rather than rules-based, cooperation 
between government leaders and local firms can provide an effective 
mechanism to boost investment even where governance is weak, although 
it also suggests that the creation of rules-based institutions may be 
necessary to sustain growth in the medium term.
The study was carried out between 2007 and 2008, and explored the 
factors driving investment performance in Manado in North Sulawesi, 
and Solo in Central Java. They are broadly similar in terms of population 
and size of their economy, but display significant differences in the quality 
of local governance. 
Surveys of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) revealed that in 
Manado the regulatory environment was perceived as complex and 
confusing, and provided considerable room for rent-seeking. Over 80 per 
cent of SMEs surveyed saw the licensing process as corrupt, with the 
majority using informal intermediaries (mostly government officials) to 
obtain licences. By contrast, in Solo, perceptions of the regulatory 
environment were much less negative, and licensing procedures had been 
streamlined through the establishment of an effective one-stop shop.
Overall, relations between municipal authorities and business are much 
more inclusive in Solo than in Manado. In Manado, large businesses well 
connected to government receive preferential treatment. Small businesses 
lack channels of influence, and struggle to comply with the complex, 
corrupt and unclear regulatory environment. In Solo, there is a wide 
range of business associations that include different sectoral, ethnic and 
religious interests. Competition between them restricts rent-seeking. The 
mayor has active contacts (both formal and informal) with a wide range 
of businesses, and is not perceived as favouring particular groups. 
Key finding
 · Exclusive, personal relations between government leaders and 
business reduced the risks to key investors and were more important 
in boosting investment in the short term than formal governance 
arrangements.
(Patunru et al. 2009)
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Sectoral business associations are able to voice policy concerns. 
In Manado economic development has been led by a small number of 
private sector actors rather than government, which lacks a coordinated 
plan. Solo, by contrast, has an active development plan resulting from 
high levels of inclusiveness in policymaking. 
The outcome for investment has not, however, reflected these differences 
in local governance. Investment flows have increased significantly in both 
cities in recent years. In Manado, despite its high levels of rent-seeking, 
exclusive relationships between government and key economic actors, 
and minimal public planning, investment grew rapidly during the three 
years prior to the study, and included growth of micro, small and 
medium-sized enterprises.
External factors were important in explaining the economic performance 
of both cities, including the general health of the national economy, and 
big increases in commodity prices, which particularly benefited Manado. 
But qualitative evidence from in-depth interviews underlines the 
importance of relationship-based, rather than rules-based, cooperation 
between government leaders and local firms in boosting investment. In 
Manado investments took place because specific permissions were given 
to large individual investors; in Solo an improved sense of security on the 
part of the private sector was the trigger for increased investment. These 
findings challenge assumptions about the importance of the broader 
investment climate, and confirm the idea that local policymaking 
influences investment primarily by reducing the risks faced by key 
investors, rather than by reducing the costs of doing business for all. 
However, the highly personalised, exclusive relations that encouraged 
investment in Manado in the short term may not be sustainable in the 
longer term. After completion of the fieldwork, Manado’s mayor was 
being detained for alleged misappropriation of government funds for 
personal enrichment, and his vice mayor faced a court allegation for 
corruption. So in the medium term, the instability caused by corruption 
and rising inequality may undermine the effectiveness of exclusive, 
informal relationships in boosting investment, and progress in Solo may 
prove to be more sustainable.
Local government investment promotion in China
Local 
policymaking 
influences 
investment 
primarily by 
reducing the 
risks faced by 
key investors, 
rather than by 
reducing the 
costs of doing 
business for all.
Key finding
 · The superior performance of one investment promotion agency is 
explained by informal personal and political relations and alignment 
of interests between local and higher level officials. 
(Hampton 2006)
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Another comparative study – this time between two government 
investment promotion agencies in the northern coastal city of Tianjin in 
China – also provides evidence of the importance of personal relations 
and alignment of interests between public and private actors in explaining 
differences in investment performance.
China has been outstandingly successful in attracting foreign investment, 
despite its lack of formal ‘best-practice’ rule of law institutions. However, 
there are huge variations in investment levels within the country, and even 
within the coastal region. The CFS research sought to explain differences in 
investment performance between two neighbouring investment promotion 
agencies – the Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area (TEDA) 
which has been highly successful in attracting foreign direct investment, 
and the Dongli Economic-Technological Development Area (DEDA), 
which has not.
Investment promotion agencies (IPAs) act as a bridge between the interests of 
the Chinese government and the Communist Party (in economic growth, tax 
revenues, job creation and management skills – all of which can enhance 
personal reputation and advancement), and the needs and interests of foreign 
investors. IPAs provide potential foreign investors with information (especially 
critical at early stages of engagement), access to land, specific investment 
opportunities and preferential policies, and ongoing support for 
implementation. All this can contribute to establishing credible levels of trust 
with investors.
The study found that TEDA provided: extensive, accessible and reliable 
information, including responses to specific queries within 24 hours; flexibility 
in meeting investors’ needs for land and preferential policy packages; a 
one-stop administrative centre for all permits; and proactive ongoing support. 
This contrasted with the much less effective role of DEDA which provided 
poor, inconsistent, outdated information, was slow in responding to inquiries 
and ineffective in putting together credible policy packages.
The main explanation for the differences lay in the fact that TEDA was very 
well connected through personal networks linking its officials to party and 
government at sub-national and national levels. It had close links with the 
municipality of Tianjin (three of its recent former directors were promoted to 
become members of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) of Tianjin, and a fourth became vice mayor). These links 
benefited both sides: TEDA got policy support, extra resources and freedom 
to provide preferential policies to investors; the Tianjin municipality got 
growth, revenues, and enhanced domestic and international status. Very 
high-level support from the Tianjin-born Premier Wen Jiabao allowed TEDA 
to extend its boundary and circumvent new land laws. Its political 
connections and bargaining power enabled it to generate capital (from 
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retention of tax revenue and access to bank loans), and to build new 
infrastructure.
By contrast DEDA had weak political links, meaning it was less able to recruit 
high-quality staff. It had lower incentives to perform well, and lacked financial 
and political resources to secure bank loans to invest in infrastructure, and 
overcome restrictions on access to land.
In summary, the critical success factors explaining TEDA’s superior 
performance were its ability to align its interests with those of potential 
private investors, which was in turn linked to its favourable positioning 
within the political system. The establishment of an IPA alone was 
insufficient to provide an administrative or regulatory ‘fix’ to attract 
investment. It also needed political and personal relationships in order to 
forge alliances within the public sector, and thus obtain the clout for 
constructive deals with the private sector.
Fee extraction by local governments in China 
In China, sub-national governments extract significant amounts of money 
from businesses through a wide variety of ‘fees’. Fees are different from 
regular taxes. In particular, they appear arbitrary and unpredictable. Fees 
are much resented, and frequently cited as a major obstacle to investment 
and enterprise. If the Chinese economy were doing badly, fee extraction 
would almost certainly be cited as a cause. It conforms exactly to the 
standard image of the predatory state suppressing private enterprise. Yet 
private investment continues to boom in China. Fee extraction cannot be 
as damaging as it first appears. The CFS investigated this issue, using 
both national-level firm surveys and in-depth interviews with local 
officials and entrepreneurs. Fee extraction is less damaging than we tend 
to assume because it is not simply what it first appears to be. It is actually 
part of a set of exchange processes between economic and political actors 
that allow each to achieve their immediate objectives while maintaining a 
positive investment climate. Businesses pay fees and in return obtain 
access to scarce resources controlled by officials of sub-national 
governments. Local officials use fee collection to obtain the cooperation 
of business in helping them to meet their objectives. 
It is not very surprising that larger enterprises pay lower proportions of 
their business turnover in fees. They are in a better position to bargain 
Key finding
 · The potentially damaging impact of arbitrary fees levied on 
business by local governments is mitigated by informal bargains 
that give well-connected businesses preferential access to state 
loans and other resources. 
(Choi 2009)
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with local officials. Larger businesses not only pay lower fees (in relation 
to turnover), but also obtain privileged access to scarce credit, that is still 
to a large extent allocated through official channels. They obtain what is 
termed ‘selective protection’; in addition to normal duties, individual 
local officials have special relationships with and responsibilities for 
individual large firms. In return, larger companies help local officials 
achieve their objectives by, for example, complying willingly and quickly 
with government policies, or by helping local officials in their relationships 
with higher-level officials. The more surprising finding was that, taking 
firm size into account, the businesses with better political connections to 
the ruling communist party paid higher fees in relation to turnover. A 
high proportion of business people are members of the ruling party and 
hold positions within it. Business people who were party members paid 
higher fees than those who were not party members. Members who were 
also elected delegates to intra-party bodies paid more in fees than 
ordinary members. This pattern is contrary to conventional expectations 
of the abuse of political power to predate on private business in an 
authoritarian political system. Again, the politically well-connected 
businesses had privileged access to credit, but in return helped local 
officials achieve their objectives. These privileged relationships were 
stronger in economic sectors in which success was especially dependent 
on good relationships with local government: real estate, finance, 
transport, mining, electricity and gas, education and culture, and 
irrigation construction.   
There is little doubt that fee extraction is a problem; the central 
government has long been struggling, with increasing success, to make 
sub-national governments reform and regularise their revenue-raising 
activities. The system is distortionary in the economists’ sense of the  
term. But it represents a workable compromise, consistent with high 
levels of private investment, in an institutional context in which there  
is a persistent possibility that political power will be used in ways that  
would undermine the confidence of private investors. Policymakers  
need to understand such relationships not in order to recommend or 
emulate them, but to appreciate that they may be far less problematic in 
reality than they appear in the light of standard, rules-based ways of 
thinking about these issues.    
3.5 Conclusions and policy messages
These findings illustrate the power of ‘ turning the picture upside down’ 
– of closing off conventional assumptions about what constitutes a ‘good’ 
investment climate, and looking instead in a more open-minded way at 
what is actually driving investment in a given context. The results are 
counter-intuitive. In each of these cases what boosted productive private 
investment was not rules-based governance but personal, initially 
exclusive, often covert arrangements and relationships that allowed 
public and private actors to reach a common understanding of the 
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Policymakers 
should focus on 
how to facilitate 
productive 
engagement 
between 
government and 
business.
problems they faced, and to identify common interests in addressing 
them. This turns conventional wisdom on its head and suggests that 
instead of prioritising new rules-based arrangements as the main way of 
improving the investment climate, policymakers should focus on how to 
facilitate productive engagement between government and business, and 
consider whether informal arrangements offer a way forward.
This is not an either/or choice between formal institutions and informal 
relationships. There is a constant interplay between them. The wider 
political and institutional context clearly shapes the way informal 
arrangements play out, as does the organisational capacity within both 
the government and the private sector. Moreover, while informal 
relationships and exclusive bargains can help boost investment in the 
short term, more inclusive and institutionalised arrangements are almost 
certainly needed to sustain it over the longer term. But informal 
relationships may be able to pave the way for more rules-based 
governance, and in the meantime facilitate productive cooperation.
For policymakers, the finding that informal arrangements can offer 
effective transitional ways of increasing productive investment is 
important because it is potentially actionable. There may be things that 
can be done in the short-to-medium term to help shift incentives and 
increase productive dialogue between public and private actors. But the 
findings also suggest that external actors should view with some modesty 
their ability directly to influence these very informal processes.
What they can do is to develop new ‘drawing skills’: they can make 
different starting assumptions, and ask a different set of questions. 
Instead of focusing on how to remedy perceived deficiencies in rules-
based governance, they should ask what is actually driving the interests of 
political and business leaders, whether there is scope for productive 
bargaining between them, and how far this might overlap with a 
progressive agenda. Such questions are likely to offer useful starting 
points in virtually any context.
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4.1 Introduction
Improving the coverage and quality of basic services for poor people is an 
enduring development challenge. Poor people, more than any other 
group, rely on public services to provide them with the skills, healthcare 
and livelihood support needed to fulfil basic human rights and to succeed 
in the labour market. Access to education is the main route for escaping 
poverty, while lack of healthcare is one of the main reasons why 
households fall into poverty. The CFS research on service delivery looked 
at the impact of public reforms on the ability of poor people to mobilise 
and make demands on the state, against the background of major shifts 
over the past two decades including decentralisation, the creation of 
participatory institutions, and big increases in the number and types of 
service providers.
A major stream of the research explored in depth three cases of successful 
reforms of public services that are now contributing to large-scale poverty 
reduction – the universal provision of healthcare and conditional cash 
transfers in Brazil, and the passage of Right to Information legislation in 
India and its use to monitor the Public Distribution System (PDS). A 
fourth case looked at major reforms that changed approaches to women’s 
reproductive health in India. The research focused on the complex 
interaction between state and society actors that underpinned these 
reforms to investigate:  
 
Mobilising for better 
public services4
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 · what role collective action by poor people, or those working on their 
behalf, played in achieving the reforms; and,  
 · how different kinds of public sector reform and models of service 
delivery affected the ability of poor people, or those working on their 
behalf, to organise collective action that influenced policy and 
subsequently ensured its effective implementation.
Local policymakers and international donors have spent years looking for 
ways of improving service delivery. Once again, development fashions 
have come and gone. Support for public service reform to improve direct 
provision of services was followed by New Public Management 
approaches in the 1990s that sought to change incentives of providers by 
giving service users more choice. There was a big expansion in the 
number and types of providers as services were decentralised, contracted 
out and privatised. By contrast, the 2004 World Development Report 
(World Bank 2004) emphasised the importance of strengthening direct 
accountability of service providers to users through arrangements to 
encourage the participation of poor people, and to strengthen their ‘voice’ 
through computerised complaints systems, citizen charters and other 
mechanisms. However such approaches to enhancing ‘direct 
accountability’, which focus on action by individual consumers may do 
little to help poor people who have no access to services in the first place, 
and are too vulnerable to undertake the effort and risks involved. Even in 
modern cities such as São Paulo and Mexico City, only a very small 
minority of poor people raise complaints or make demands on public 
officials about public services or infrastructure (either directly or through 
third parties) (Houtzager and Acharya forthcoming).
The CFS research has been particularly concerned with the capacity of 
poor people – or those acting for them – to engage collectively with 
policymakers at national and city-government levels and (to ensure 
implementation of policy) with service providers at the community or 
neighbourhood level. Effective collective action involves organising 
around broadly shared goals, not just narrow, exclusive interests; and 
ongoing action that engages with the state, not just ad hoc protests or 
self-help initiatives. Establishing formal mechanisms for participation 
and/or ‘strengthening’ civil society groups with money and skills are 
important but not sufficient to make this happen. The research focuses on 
how to get constructive and ongoing interaction between public and 
private actors to achieve two main goals: to extend the coverage of public 
services to under-served groups, and to strengthen incentives for 
improved performance at the local point of delivery. The latter we call 
‘social accountability’.
 Effective 
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Phase 1 of the CFS research5 advanced the broad proposition that what 
the state does, how it is organised, and how public policy is designed and 
implemented all have a bearing on the ability of poor people or those 
working for them to mobilise and make demands on elected officials and 
government agencies. A prime example given was the Employment 
Guarantee Scheme in Maharashtra which was carefully designed to 
stimulate the mobilisation of potential beneficiaries, and encourage the 
engagement of political activists (Joshi 2009). The key point was that 
there is more room for stimulating collective action than is often 
supposed. How institutions are designed, and what models of service 
delivery are adopted, can have an impact on collective action by poor 
users. The Phase 1 research also questioned the common assumption that 
engagement with the state inevitably leads to a loss of autonomy (often 
seen as the key to effective civil society action). A survey of civil 
organisations in São Paulo showed that it is very often organisations well 
connected to governments and political parties that give poor people a 
voice in policymaking, without sacrificing their ability to engage, when 
needed, in more contentious ways of pressing for government action 
(Gurza Lavalle et al. 2005).
Phase 2 of the research uses new data-gathering methods, extends the 
findings to the point of service delivery, and deepens them to identify the 
role of issue-based networks that link advocates for better services to 
reformist public officials. It focuses on critical cases of reform in the 
health and social assistance sectors in São Paulo and Delhi. Using 
network analysis, case studies and a survey of service providers and 
community leaders, it asks how service delivery reforms inspired by New 
Public Management on the one hand, and increasing democratic 
participation on the other, affect the ability of poor people to mobilise 
and make claims on the state. The objective is to identify and compare 
the underlying processes at work in different contexts and sectors. There 
is a specific focus on how collective action to demand ‘social 
accountability’ from service providers is likely to emerge and be effective, 
given the weakness in many poor countries of formal mechanisms of 
accountability.
5  See ‘Signposts to More Effective States’ (IDS 2005: 20–33).
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4.2 Detailed findings
Different types of reform influence opportunities for 
collective action
The way services are reorganised or delivered can lead to the emergence 
of new actors and institutions, strengthen or weaken existing actors, and 
create opportunities for new alliances – between public and private 
actors, or across class divisions. The research highlights a striking, broad 
contrast between the design of health reforms and social assistance 
programmes in Brazil and Mexico that created different opportunities for 
collective action. Health reforms provided mechanisms to give collective 
actors a role in ongoing monitoring, while social assistance programmes 
involved direct cash transfers to families, thus bypassing civil society 
intermediaries (Houtzager and Joshi 2008). 
The Brazilian constitution of 1988 created institutional mechanisms for 
direct citizen participation in the design of public policy, resulting in a 
proliferation of participatory institutions at federal, state and municipal 
level. In particular, the public health movement in São Paulo has a long 
history of engagement in reform, and has been active in negotiating the 
design of mechanisms – such as the health policy councils – that have 
given collective actors guaranteed seats. In Mexico, the Inter-Institutional 
Group on Reproductive Health gave the women’s movement privileged 
access to forums for policy design and monitoring. In these two cases, the 
actors were able to negotiate the creation of participatory bodies that 
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Key findings
 · Different types of public sector reform, adopting different institutional 
models for designing and implementing public services, substantially 
influence the opportunities for collective actors to organise, influence 
policy, and hold service providers accountable.
 · When citizen/user groups take part in negotiations over reform, it is 
more likely that the institutional models that emerge will enable 
collective actors to organise, influence policy, and hold service providers 
accountable. 
 · When formal accountability mechanisms are weak, social 
accountability activities by local collective actors can play an 
important role in improving services. Local collective actors are more 
likely to undertake social accountability activities when they 
participate in policy reforms and/or are part of networks linking them 
to public actors. 
 · Relationships and alliances across the public-private divide are diverse 
and critical to influencing policy and organising effective collective 
action. It is the way that networks of relationships between public and 
private actors are configured that shapes their ability to influence 
reforms, not the characteristics of individual actors.
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facilitated their access to health decision-making centres over the medium 
term – thus providing them with a good ‘institutional fit’. 
By contrast, cash transfer programmes for poor people (Renda Minima in 
Brazil and Oportunidades in Mexico) were deliberately designed to 
bypass civil society intermediaries that were seen as corrupted and 
politicised. Both the nature of the programmes and arrangements for 
implementing them provided little opportunity for collective actors to 
mobilise or demand accountability (there are complaints mechanisms for 
individuals, but these are of limited use to poor people). These 
programmes have been successful in helping poor people, and show that 
collective action is not the only means of improving service delivery. But 
cash transfers are not always appropriate; moreover it may be 
problematic over the longer term to exclude collective actors who could 
play a role in ensuring that eligible families get onto the cash transfer list, 
monitoring implementation, negotiating improvements, or simply 
facilitating effective local communication with beneficiaries.
Data from São Paulo show that levels of social accountability are much 
higher for health than for social services, reflecting in part the different 
institutional models that have been adopted. For health there are lots of 
physical points of contact between citizens and agents of the state, 
including local health posts and participatory councils, the regional 
coordinating body, and the municipal health council. By contrast, for 
cash transfer programmes there are fewer physical or organisational 
contact points around which people can mobilise.
Research in India also found that different types of service provision 
resulted in different levels of collective action, and different strategies. In 
Delhi, collective actors are more intensively engaged in pressing for 
accountability and reform in relation to the Public Distribution System 
(PDS), which provides subsidised basic food grain, than they are in 
relation to health services. Health reform over the last two decades has 
emphasised decentralisation, contracting out and public-private 
partnerships. Reforms have been carried out top-down, and provision is 
fragmented, with over 70 per cent of healthcare financed by individuals. 
By contrast, the PDS operates through a single point of provision – fair 
price shops, which are run by licensed private owners. This provides a 
clear focus for collective action and makes it easier to solicit support from 
local bureaucrats, since shopowners rather than officials are the main 
targets of such action. Since 2001 civil society groups in Delhi, organised 
under the Right to Food movement, have actively campaigned for PDS 
reform. Compared to collective actors around health issues, those 
targeting the PDS were more actively engaged, made more demands for 
public information (linked to the Right to Information movement), made 
more use of administrative and legal channels, and held more public 
demonstrations (Chowdhury, forthcoming). 
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Another strand of the research into neighbourhood associations as 
collective actors in Chennai, Bangalore and Delhi (Kamath and 
Vijayabaskar 2009; Coelho and Venkat 2009; Chakrabarti 2008) found 
that poor neighbourhoods shift their modes of making claims in response 
to reforms. Part-privatisation of service delivery, and formal recognition 
of neighbourhood associations in urban areas, have legitimised direct 
links between the associations and the bureaucracy. This has made poor 
citizens more likely to pursue claims by making demands on public 
officials through their neighbourhood associations, rather than through 
approaching political parties or patrons (as they did prior to the reforms).
However, formal links to enhance citizen ‘voice’ do not always operate in 
the wider public interest. Participatory mechanisms established under the 
Bhagidari programme in Delhi were initially restricted to the better-off 
‘planned’ areas: this assisted resident welfare associations in those areas 
to capture increased amounts of public spending, and to make demands 
based on narrow class interests that disadvantaged the urban poor 
(Chakrabarti 2008).
Participation in policy reforms enhances subsequent 
collective action
The research shows that where collective actors are involved during 
significant moments of public reform, they are more likely to be able to 
influence the design of institutional mechanisms, and this allows them to 
remain engaged in monitoring implementation. This finding is important 
because it is often assumed that involvement by collective actors in 
policymaking will result in their co-optation by the state.
In Brazil, medical professionals including doctors and nurses from the 
Sanitarista public health movement pursued a long campaign for health 
sector reform, working with and within the public sector, and pushing for 
universal access, decentralisation and community participation. This 
allowed them to influence the design of institutions that gave them 
continuing access to reform processes, and facilitated their involvement in 
monitoring implementation. In Mexico, the women’s movement for 
reproductive health similarly drove the reform process from the start, and 
was thus able to help shape participatory mechanisms.
In India, the Right to Information (RTI) campaign was one of the main 
authors of the Right to Information Act that was passed in 2004. Once in 
effect, the legislation was used by an advocacy NGO in Delhi that had 
been part of the RTI campaign to demand accountability for failures of 
the PDS. This NGO was subsequently invited to take part in policy 
discussions over reforming the PDS. It remains to be seen whether they 
will be able to play an effective ongoing role, given that they were not 
involved during the initial stages of programme design (Pande 2008). In 
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Delhi, NGOs involved in lobbying for the Right to Education were 
invited to participate in the design of a universal elementary education 
programme (Mehtta 2008). This enabled them to play a role in 
implementation and monitoring, and gave them the detailed knowledge 
and legitimacy they needed to hold government accountable.
Social accountability can work for poor people
Efforts to improve service delivery through formal mechanisms of 
accountability – including elections and institutional checks and balances 
– often fail. Politicians may face weak electoral pressures to improve 
services; citizens have poor information about performance; policymakers 
lack effective ways of holding service providers accountable; horizontal 
channels of accountability through the legislature or an ombudsman 
work poorly. In such circumstances, collective action by or on behalf of 
poor people to demand accountability from policymakers and service 
providers may be effective. Groups exercising this kind of ‘social 
accountability’ lack the ability to impose formal sanctions, but they can 
have an impact by making the failures of government and service 
providers public, thus imposing reputational and political costs, and in 
some cases triggering formal accountability mechanisms (for instance 
through the courts, or an ombudsman). To be effective, such action needs 
to be targeted and sustained over a period of time, and groups need 
leverage – for example through access to information (Joshi 2008). 
Social accountability works for poor people because collective action 
makes their numbers count, and demands can be framed in terms of legal 
or moral rights. It can offer a sharper, more targeted form of 
accountability than elections. It can also help address the issue of what 
standard of services ought to be provided, by highlighting deficiencies in 
existing provision or entitlements. Unlike formal accountability 
mechanisms that emphasise process and access to existing rights, social 
accountability can also focus on whether the outcomes are satisfactory, 
and press for improvements in standards of provision. 
Research in Delhi has highlighted the role of social accountability 
activities by local collective actors in helping to improve services. For 
example, mobilisation of poor people around the PDS and the exposure 
of corruption through public hearings has reduced corruption at the local 
level, and institutionalised some transparency within the system. 
Moreover, successful mobilisation in one locality has spread to other 
neighbourhoods through connected networks of collective actors. Where 
collective actors are less engaged in social accountability – for example, in 
relation to healthcare in Delhi – there is little impetus for reform and 
delivery remains poor.
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Networks linking public and private actors are critical to 
shaping public policy, and network structures influence the 
way they interact with the state
Much of the debate about how to strengthen the capacity of poor and 
marginalised people to shape public policy has focused on formal 
institutions for citizen participation, either individually or collectively. 
These participatory institutions are often seen as key to providing a way of 
connecting under-represented groups in society with policymakers, and 
giving them a ‘voice’. Donor programmes tend to prioritise financial and 
management support for particular organisations. State and societal actors 
(including social movements and advocacy NGOs) are often portrayed as 
distinct, relatively autonomous entities (Houtzager and Castello 2009).
The CFS research calls into question important aspects of this narrative. 
Rather than focusing directly on participatory mechanisms and particular 
civil society organisations, the research starts with a detailed analysis of 
the networks of relationships within which public policymakers and civil 
society leaders operate. It finds that how state-society interaction plays out 
depends not just on the nature of public sector reform or on opportunities 
to participate through formal mechanisms, but on complex networks 
linking public and private actors. Moreover, the nature of civil society 
networks shapes the way they interact with the state.
Civil society networks and public-private relationships and alliances are 
very diverse, and rooted in both context and history. For example, the 
health movement in São Paulo goes back to the early 1980s, well before 
the ending of military rule: this helps to explain both its success in 
permeating state institutions (Houtzager and Dowbor 2010), and its 
strongly rights-based commitment to social and political reform (Dowbor 
2008). The health network in India appears to have two distinct strands, 
with origins respectively in narrowly defined population programmes, and 
movements to promote general health and reproductive rights 
(Narayanan, forthcoming). The nature of networks is also influenced by 
broader political, social and cultural environments: Phase 1 of the CFS 
research, for instance, highlighted the different orientations of civil society 
organisations in São Paulo and Mexico City, linked to different 
configurations of state, church and political parties (IDS 2005: 24). In 
India, networks tend to be elite-led rather than organisation-led (Pande, 
forthcoming).
Researchers in São Paulo interviewed key individuals involved in debates 
on health and social assistance policy, and constructed the ‘issue networks’ 
of which they were the most important part. These networks were 
composed of people claiming to represent low-income service users, 
professionals and experts, trade union leaders, service providers and 
public officials.
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The research found that:
i) People who occupied seats on the formal participatory councils 
covering health and social assistance were relatively marginal players 
in their respective issues networks. Although the councils have legally 
mandated budgetary oversight and decision-making powers, they were 
not found to be a critical channel for policymaking, or a space within 
which key players in health and social assistance networks operated.
ii) This did not result in a lack of connection between the state and actors 
representing poor and marginalised groups. Instead, the two issues 
networks permeated the state: members of the networks held key 
positions within the state – in municipal secretariats, the city assembly, 
and in state and federal government. This provided them with multiple 
formal and informal channels through which to influence policy. 
However, while the networks gave people access and influence, they did 
not capture decision-making processes; nor did they become clientelistic.
iii) Who is able to influence policy, and the strategies they adopt, depend 
on the internal structure of the networks. The health network in São 
Paulo is relatively horizontal and inclusive, providing multiple links 
between societal actors and policymakers. By contrast, the social 
assistance network is hierarchical, and bifurcated: a small number of 
well-positioned service providers control access to some parts of the 
state, while a distinct group of social assistance experts enjoys a high 
level of access to another part. User groups barely feature in this latter 
network at all.
iv) Professional groups – public health professionals in the case of health, 
and economists in the case of social assistance programmes – played a 
strong role in influencing reform. This is unexpected as such groups 
are often portrayed as having vested interests in opposing public sector 
reform.
CFS research in Delhi also emphasises the importance of networks linking 
public and private actors, not just formal participatory mechanisms, in 
shaping reforms. In Delhi, research found that local actors who are linked 
into broader city-wide or national policy networks are more likely to 
engage in collective action, because they are better informed about 
policies and programmes, and better able to use networks to support 
their mobilisation and monitoring activities. As noted above, for 
example, in the PDS sector local organisations were able to use Right to 
Information legislation effectively because they were well connected to 
the RTI movement.
Moreover, just as different structures of health and social assistance 
networks in São Paulo affect their impact and strategies, so in India the 
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nature of networks influences how they interact with the state. For 
example, the food security network in India has a very narrow policy 
interface with the state (limited to a handful of individuals), despite 
having a large mass organisation at the grassroots level. So the creation 
by the Supreme Court in 2002 of ‘Commissioners’ to monitor the 
implementation of interim orders relating to public nutrition programmes 
provided a key (formal) mechanism through which the small number of 
top leaders of the Right to Food movement could influence policymakers. 
This contrasts with the relatively marginal importance of health policy 
councils in São Paulo, where dense networks of civil society actors had 
multiple points of access to policymakers, and therefore less need of 
formal mechanisms.
Finally, the structure of networks, and the way they are linked to 
policymakers means that their influence is enhanced or diminished 
according to the changing fortunes of political parties. In India, for 
example, the health network linked to international organisations with a 
focus on narrowly defined programmes had more influence when the 
coalition led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was in power; the 
network focusing on the right to health, by contrast, gained influence 
when the Congress-led coalition returned to power in 2004.
4.3 Conclusions and policy messages 
The main research reported here was restricted to two sectors, and two 
large cities, employing common analytical frameworks and 
methodologies to maximise the chances of making some valid 
generalisations. However, these would need to be tested to see whether 
they hold in very different contexts – for example in rural areas, smaller 
cities, or in countries with lower levels of economic development and 
weaker political and institutional environments.
Nevertheless the research does offer some useful pointers for 
policymakers that may have wider relevance. Firstly, it underlines one of 
the core messages from the Phase 1 research: the importance of avoiding 
normative preconceptions, and of conducting open-minded, detailed 
inquiry into which collective actors are engaging in policy reform, and 
what factors enhance or impede their effectiveness. Even a comparison 
limited to two specific sectors in two big cities, both located in BRIC 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), highlighted the complexity 
and diversity of state-society relations around service delivery, and the 
importance of history and context in shaping the way policy networks are 
structured and the opportunities for collective actors to influence them.
The second policy-relevant finding is that the way public programmes are 
designed clearly affects opportunities for collective action. This underlines 
the need to think about the impact of all public policy interventions on 
the ability and incentives of different groups to mobilise. For example 
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‘choice’ reforms such as the cash transfer programmes in Brazil and 
Mexico can undermine opportunities for collective action. Top-down 
reform, or very fragmented provision (for example, health sector reform 
in India) can also impede collective action. By contrast, the existence of 
the private licence-holder in the PDS case enabled public officials in Delhi 
to demand better performance without publicly criticising their own 
colleagues. 
In São Paulo, participatory mechanisms which were an integral part of 
health and social assistance reforms have been important in shaping 
opportunities for collective action, although the issue networks that 
brought together civil society actors and policymakers in multiple, formal 
and informal ways proved to be more influential. This suggests the need 
for some caution, especially on the part of external actors, about their 
ability to engineer quick institutional fixes. What the research does 
emphasise is that collective action that benefits poor people does not arise 
automatically from strengthening civil society organisations – existing 
networks of actors will greatly influence whether (or how) strengthening 
particular organisations translates into greater capacity to shape policy, 
and on whose behalf. For example, strengthening organisations that are 
located on the margins of the network and have few relations to agents of 
the state is likely to have limited impact, whereas strengthening those 
central to the network and well connected to state actors is likely to 
produce far greater impact. Facilitating the formation of linkages between 
existing actors, and between them and agents of the state, may be 
particularly important. Investing in strengthening networks that have a 
strong vertical reach (from policymakers to the grassroots) might be a 
good strategy for achieving improvements in social accountability. 
Finally, what is clear from all the examples of successful reform examined 
by the research is that fiercely protecting civil society autonomy is not the 
answer. In every case, broad-based alliances that crossed the public-
private divide and brought together a range of key actors around 
common interests in reform – constructing a form of ‘embedded 
autonomy’ – were critical to success. One of the clearest examples comes 
from health sector reforms in Brazil during the early 1980s. These were 
underpinned by common interests between the military (supporting 
expansion of social rights), progressive technocrats in the bureaucracy 
(supporting rationalisation of services as a response to fiscal crisis), and 
the public health reform movement. Another example comes from the 
Right to Information movement in India that brought together a broad 
coalition across class and caste, including labourers, farmers, journalists, 
bureaucrats, lawyers, and social activists.
The research prompts more questions than it can answer, and some that it 
can only partially answer. For instance, the research does show that civil 
society organisations that are party to policy negotiations can also act as 
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effective watchdogs of implementation; but it does not explicitly address 
the question of why in some cases they become co-opted and demobilised, 
and in others manage to retain their capacity to act independently. The 
research shows that the service delivery and social accountability roles of 
NGOs are not mutually exclusive, but not exactly why or under what 
conditions this is so. In some cases – for example health and social 
assistance in São Paulo – contracting out service delivery creates a new 
lobby of providers with an interest in pushing for more contracts, bigger 
budgets and higher wages, and thus in pressing for expanded coverage 
and greater benefits for their clients. But engagement in service provision 
could dampen the enthusiasm of collective actors for monitoring and 
accountability – this seems to have been the case with NGO health 
providers in Delhi. While further research can throw light on these 
questions, it seems likely that detailed answers and policy 
recommendations will have to be developed in a context-specific way.
One particularly critical set of questions arises from this strand of the 
research: who do civil organisations speak for, and with what authority, 
when they are invited to participate in policy dialogue or when they 
engage in social accountability?6 What are policymakers to make of their 
claims to ‘represent’ the people they are working with and for? For 
example, in São Paulo, civil organisations often claim to ‘represent’ the 
interests of lower-income groups, when they speak or negotiate on their 
behalf in participatory governance fora. But (in contrast to political 
parties or labour unions) most of these organisations have no formal 
membership or mandates, and no accountability mechanisms based on 
elections. Their claims to representation are founded on their physical 
proximity to the groups they work with, their openness to participation, 
the fact that they are providing tangible benefits to those they claim to 
represent, and their mediating role in connecting excluded segments of 
the population to the state and political-electoral arenas (Houtzager and 
Gurza Lavalle 2010). 
Such claims to representation should not be rejected out of hand. Where 
a poor minority has little relation to the state, associations do help to 
connect people to public officials and to providers of public services. 
Policymakers should be prepared to consider, in an open-minded way, 
how these kind of informal arrangements are really working before 
assessing their compatibility with democratic norms and processes. But 
they might want to encourage active participation in associations, and to 
pay more attention to ways of strengthening the accountability of civil 
society organisations to their constituencies (for example through formal 
membership arrangements and mechanisms for debating and adopting
6  This was also addressed during Phase 1 of the research: see ‘Signposts to More Effective States’ 
(IDS 2005: 31–2).
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policy positions). This could help increase the accountability of civil 
society organisations when they engage in policy negotiations, increase 
their credibility and their access to policymaking processes (because they 
can ‘deliver’ their publics), and increase the potential for poor people, 
operating as citizens, to gain access to the state and to public services. 
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‘Traditional’ local 
governance: problem or 
solution?
5
5.1 Introduction
The abolition of ‘traditional’ authority7 was a major objective of 
independence movements in much of the developing world. ‘Traditional’ 
institutions – including individual chiefs in much of Africa, chiefs, kings or 
traditional councils in the Pacific, and landlords responsible for collecting 
land revenue in most of South Asia – had been powerful intermediaries 
between ordinary citizens and colonial rulers. ‘Modernisation’ and 
‘development’ meant bringing ordinary citizens into a direct relationship 
with modern government bureaucracies and political parties.
Many of these ‘traditional’ authorities were indeed outlawed or 
significantly weakened. But their influence has proved surprisingly 
persistent. And in recent years the ideological pendulum has swung back. 
‘Traditional’ authorities in Benin, Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, India, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, 
Somaliland, Tonga, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe have been legally 
recognised and given consultative or administrative roles, especially at 
local government level. 
7  The quotation marks around ‘traditional’ are used to indicate that claims by leaders and 
institutions to be traditional should not be taken at face value: traditions may be re-invented to 
bolster legitimacy and are continually being reshaped by interaction with ‘modern’, formal 
institutions.
an UPs IDe  DoWn v I eW of  governance
50
In some cases, the immediate motive has been the need to placate 
particular ethnic groups. But the main factor underlying this official 
revalidation of ‘traditional’ authority has been prevalence of broad 
governance problems. As governments based in capital cities have 
struggled to establish legitimacy and authority, they have seen 
cooperation with ‘traditional’ institutions as a way to bolster their own 
position and to co-opt potentially powerful opponents. In situations of 
violent conflict and state collapse, international actors have also viewed 
‘traditional’ authorities as a useful source of local political stability. DFID 
supported efforts to re-establish the authority of ‘traditional’ chiefs in 
Sierra Leone during the conflicts there. In contemporary Afghanistan, 
Western forces have tried to recruit ‘traditional’ tribal militias (arbakai) 
to provide security at the local level.
Is active support for and cooperation with ‘traditional’ authorities a 
sensible policy? Does it help create effective, legitimate and accountable 
public authority? Or does it empower exploitative local elites, violate 
basic principles of modern citizenship and accountable, representative 
government, and ultimately impede the task of state building? In 
situations of crisis, like contemporary Afghanistan or Sierra Leone in the 
1990s, these questions become urgent. But a large number of 
contemporary governments actually face similar choices on a routine 
basis. Should they ignore ‘traditional’ authorities, try to repress them, or 
actively use and collaborate with them?
In practice, governments often do all three. For example, in rural India, 
the police liaise with informal village councils over the treatment of 
crimes, while the courts occasionally prosecute those same village councils 
for illegally sanctioning wrongdoers, and most official agencies pretend 
that they simply do not exist. Development agencies adopt similarly 
contrary positions when they condemn ‘traditional’ institutions for their 
gender and other sociocultural biases, but simultaneously support their 
activities under the label of ‘alternative dispute resolution mechanisms’.
Much of the time, the actual relationships between traditional authority 
and modern state institutions are determined informally and locally, with 
a strong bias toward continuity. The explicit debates that do impact on 
the occasional formal policy change often polarise around conflicting 
attitudes, ideologies and world views, and are rarely grounded in 
research. The case for tolerating or actively supporting traditional 
authorities may range from a pragmatic acceptance of reality to a militant 
belief in their unique capacity to represent and protect local culture. 
Opponents tend to view them as a step in the wrong direction: the 
antithesis of contemporary norms of governance and citizenship. 
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There is no right, general position for or against ‘traditional’ institutions: 
policy recommendations have to be very context-specific. But there are 
ways of reframing the debate to make it more objective and policy-
relevant. Above all, the language of ‘traditional’ institutions/authority is 
counterproductive. It is diversionary because it immediately elicits 
prejudices for or against the opposed concepts of ‘tradition’ and 
‘modernity’. It is misleading because so-called ‘traditional’ institutions 
vary widely in the depth of their historical roots and in the extent to 
which they have adapted to – and are compatible with – other political 
institutions, including formal state institutions. 
These conclusions emerge from a comparative research project that the 
CFS has undertaken over the past seven years on the workings of 
‘informal local governance institutions’ (ILGIs) in Karnataka and 
Rajasthan in India, and in Punjab province of Pakistan (Mohmand et al. 
forthcoming). The research explores the social value of ILGIs: how are 
they structured, how do they interact with the formal state, and what are 
the outcomes for poor people? And it asks how their performance is 
shaped by their history – both the extent to which they are rooted in 
institutions of direct or indirect colonial era rule, and whether they are 
changing in response to a changing social and political environment.
5.2 What are informal local governance institutions?
ILGIs are less prominent in South Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
indirect colonial rule was more extensive, and formal authority was 
almost always delegated to individual chiefs, including the authority to 
allocate land rights. Most ILGIs in South Asia receive no formal 
recognition from the state, and villagers themselves are often reticent 
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Key findings
 · ILGIs in South Asia are persistent, and influential. Efforts to 
improve local governance need to take account of them.
 · They can provide public goods and services, and connect the rural 
poor to the formal state. But they can also entrench the interests 
of dominant groups and perpetuate poverty.
 · They can work in ways that complement and/or compete with the 
formal state.
 · Although ILGIs are universally termed ‘traditional’ by the people 
to whom they matter, the extent to which they are rooted in 
history varies widely.
 · Current differences between ILGIs are closely related to their 
origins in colonial era institutions of direct and indirect rule. The 
more directly they are descended from systems of indirect colonial 
rule, the worse they govern today. The more they have been 
reshaped in interaction with more pluralistic, democratic, 
inclusive formal institutions, the more likely they are to meet 
acceptable governance standards. 
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about their activities. Yet in the areas covered by the CFS research ILGIs 
clearly play an important day-to-day role in the lives of villagers, as well 
as influencing public policy.
ILGIs in Karnataka, Rajasthan and Pakistani Punjab take different forms. 
In Karnataka, for example, village councils are composed of leaders of 
local caste groups, while in Pakistani Punjab an individual landowner 
often exercises informal authority. But they share some broad 
characteristics. They resemble states in that they exercise authority over 
an entire locality, including the whole locally resident population, and 
undertake a broad range of activities including resolving disputes and 
organising social and development activities. Unlike states they do not 
have revenue-raising powers, but do collect funds for particular purposes. 
Their relations with the formal state are ambiguous, variable and often 
contested. However, they play an important mediating role between 
‘their’ populations and the outside world, and this role is becoming more 
important with the extension of local electoral democracy, and increasing 
availability of local development funds.
Typical ILGIs in Karnataka contrast particularly strongly with those in 
the Pakistani Punjab. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 below give more detail on each 
case. In Karnataka, where colonial rule was relatively direct, post-
independence governments implemented progressive policies including 
land reform and local electoral democracy. ILGIs have been substantively 
reshaped through interaction with more pluralistic, democratic formal 
governance institutions. By contrast, in Pakistani Punjab, while ILGIs 
have evolved to some extent, they remain largely rooted in colonial 
practices of indirect rule, with authority concentrated in landowning 
families and kinship groups.
5.3 Informal local governance in Karnataka
The research built on CFS Phase 1 work8 in 30 villages in three districts 
of Karnataka, and extended it to a further 26 villages (Ananth Pur and 
Moore 2010). It confirmed that informal village councils are actively 
engaging with formal, elected councils (Gram Panchayats). They are 
moving beyond traditional roles of resolving disputes and regulating 
social relations within the village. They are becoming more active in 
seeking access to public funds, influencing decisions about development 
projects, and raising matching contributions. They are also influencing 
elections to the Gram Panchayats: leaders and members of the informal 
village councils are standing for election or seeking to influence 
nominations. Far from being eclipsed by the elected panchayats, informal 
councils appear to have been stimulated by them: the research shows, for 
example, that informal councils tend to be more active when they are 
8  For a summary see ‘Signposts to More Effective States’ (IDS 2005: 25–7).
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located close to Gram Panchayat headquarters. 
This increased activism could be negative if it were merely a way of 
furthering elite interests. But the evidence suggests that, while informal 
councils can be repressive and exclusionary – especially when dealing 
with affairs internal to the village – they are playing effective roles in 
representing the needs of villagers to higher levels of government, in 
negotiating and mediating interests with the Gram Panchayats, and in 
monitoring their performance. For instance, in villages where informal 
councils are most active, the levels of awareness and satisfaction with 
Gram Panchayat programmes are also relatively high. Women are more 
enthusiastic about informal village councils than men, and illiterates more 
than literates. 
Informal village councils are also widening their basis of recruitment. 
Elected male members of the Gram Panchayats have been co-opted to sit 
on the informal councils in most of the study villages, reflecting the 
emergence of a new type of younger leader, whose power is rooted in 
their education and ability to mediate between villagers and outside 
actors, sometimes independently of their caste identities. However, Dalits 
are still mainly excluded, and women completely so. Though rooted in 
caste, decision-making of informal village councils is mostly consensual 
and transparent; meetings are public and follow clear procedures.
A number of factors help explain this broadly positive picture. Informal 
village councils do not control access to land and other valuable assets, so 
their opportunities for abuse of power are limited. Indeed informal 
councils are highly accountable over financial issues, presenting detailed 
accounts annually to a general village assembly. Moreover, informal 
councils face a pluralistic, competitive environment in which villagers 
have options: for example, they can take disputes to the police or formal 
courts if dissatisfied with informal dispute resolution mechanisms. When 
they attempt to influence the membership of Gram Panchayats by 
organising uncontested elections, they do so partly to save on the high 
costs of contested elections. They may have to compete with local 
representatives of national political parties, who favour electoral contests. 
The research shows that those informal village councils that invest the 
most effort in organising local meetings to achieve consensus on 
nominees are the most successful in having their nominees elected. 
Leaders and members of informal councils need to work hard to earn the 
trust of villagers, and actively retain their support. The increasing shift 
towards a more collective, externally oriented role for informal councils 
is also helping to make them more pluralistic and inclusive.
5.4 Informal local governance in Pakistani Punjab
Punjab province in Pakistan has high levels of social and economic 
inequality. ILGIs there are dominated by a landowning elite established 
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during colonial land settlement processes in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. They have remained powerful despite land reform 
legislation and local government electoral reform. Politics in Punjab is less 
competitive than in Karnataka, and heavily based on personal connections.
ILGIs in Punjab revolve around the village head: this can be an individual 
large landowner, a group of men from landowning lineage groups, or an 
informal council of male heads of socially dominant families. They 
mediate relationships between villagers and the state, facilitating access to 
services, government departments, police and the courts. Authority is 
exercised in highly personalised, non-transparent ways. Compared to 
Karnataka, ILGIs in Punjab are more inward-looking, focusing on 
internal village affairs, including controlling access to jobs, regulating 
relations between different groups, and resolving disputes. They do 
however play a major role in influencing voting patterns. 
Overall, while they have evolved to some extent, ILGIs in Punjab remain 
largely hierarchical and exclusionary, and relations with the formal state 
are competitive rather than complementary. But the research did identify 
important differences among them (Cheema and Naseer 2010). Within 
Sargodha district these differences are closely related to different land 
tenure systems established under colonial rule, with resulting differences 
in socioeconomic structures and informal governance (details in Section 
5.5 below). Especially striking is the impact of such differences on 
economic mobility. The research looked at educational attainment across 
three generations as an indicator of economic mobility, and found it 
closely related to a household’s historic social position, with historically 
depressed social groups doing much worse than the rest and continuing 
to diverge from them. Moreover, historic village-level institutions and 
socioeconomic structures affected inter-generational mobility. Mobility 
was higher across all social groups in villages where land inequality was 
less and authority was more horizontally distributed, compared to 
villages with greater historic inequality, a larger proportion of landless 
tenants, and more hierarchical social and governance structures. 
5.5 Explaining the diversity of informal local 
      governance in South Asia: the legacy of direct   
      and indirect rule
As already noted, the research found considerable diversity among ILGIs 
in terms of their structure, process and outcomes. There are broad and 
quite stark differences between Pakistani Punjab at one extreme and 
Karnataka at the other (with Rajasthan somewhere in between). There 
are also significant variations within states, provinces and districts, and 
even between ILGIs in neighbouring villages. There appears to be a close 
correspondence between the form of colonial era rule (more direct rule in 
Karnataka, and more indirect rule in Punjab) and the nature of 
contemporary ILGIs. This suggests a broad hypothesis: the more closely 
ILGIs remain rooted in the practices of indirect colonial institutions, the 
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worse they govern (judged by their ability to provide valued collective 
goods and services, and to operate in relatively pluralistic, consensual and 
transparent ways). Conversely, the more they have been reshaped in 
interaction with more pluralistic, democratic, inclusive formal 
institutions, the more likely they are to meet acceptable governance 
standards.
A more detailed look at the impact of direct and indirect rule in British 
India provides evidence to support this hypothesis, and helps to explain 
the causal mechanisms involved. CFS research findings are also in line 
with those of other scholars who have studied the impact of colonial era 
rule in Africa and elsewhere. 
Indirect rule was characterised by a small bureaucratic central state that 
had very limited capacity to control the territory. Colonial rulers 
governed through a chain of hierarchical relationships, giving sub-
national elites extensive, largely unchecked authority over local 
populations. This included rights to collect taxes, maintain law and order, 
adjudicate disputes and (especially in Africa) allocate land. Indirect rule 
created a system of decentralised petty despots, organised along 
patrimonial lines but with little accountability to local people, and with 
limited supervision by the central state.
By contrast, direct rule involved an integrated state more on West 
European lines, with centralised, bureaucratic, legal-administrative 
institutions directly controlled by colonial officials. Scholars of British 
colonial rule (notably Lange 2009) demonstrate that direct rule had a 
much more positive effect on broad-based development than indirect rule. 
Direct rule created bureaucratic capacity, ‘infrastructural’ power to 
provide developmental goods throughout the territory, and more inclusive 
state-society relations.
In South Asia there was a broad distinction between ‘directly ruled’ 
British India, and the ‘indirectly ruled’ princely states. But there was also 
considerable variation within British India, with more direct/indirect rule 
rooted in the land revenue system. This ranged from very indirect systems 
(common in Punjab) where responsibility for collecting revenue was 
delegated to local notables, to surprisingly direct systems where the agent 
of the formal state was charged with collecting land revenue from 
individual owners – based on detailed, written land records (common in 
South India).The less direct the revenue relationship, the more the overall 
governance system was ‘indirect’.
In Sargodha district of Pakistani Punjab current variations between ILGIs 
correspond closely to different land tenure and revenue systems 
established under colonial rule. There are two main types.
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i) So-called ‘proprietary villages’ where rights were granted to an 
individual or family, with all authority vested in landlords to mediate 
the relationship between cultivators and the state. Here contemporary 
ILGIs are hierarchical, hereditary, and narrowly based on the  
authority of an individual or family (although there have been limited 
changes).
ii) So-called ‘canal colony’ or ‘crown estate’ villages, where authority was 
vested in the semi-formal office of a village headman (or lambadaar) 
chosen among larger established landowners, with relatively direct 
relations with villagers. Here there is a lower level of land inequality, 
and authority structures are more horizontal.
Current variations between ILGIs in Karnataka also reflect their origins 
in different systems of direct and indirect rule. Out of the 26 villages that 
were studied under the Phase 2 research, 19 are formerly ryotwari (direct 
revenue systems) and 7 are formerly zamindari or jagirdari (indirect). The 
ILGIs in the ex-ryotwari villages are less successful in tapping external 
funding sources, but function in a more pluralistic way and are much 
more active in undertaking self-funded development activities.
5.6 Conclusions and policy messages 
ILGIs in South Asia are persistent, influential and have an important 
impact on the daily lives of poor people in rural areas. Efforts to improve 
local governance need to take account of them. But how? Echoing the 
broader question underlying all the CFS research programmes, should 
policymakers see such informal institutions as part of the problem, or 
part of the solution? 
Land revenue systems in British India 
These varied significantly between locations and over time, the core models 
including:
 · Indirect systems, where revenue collection was delegated to local 
notables (often known as the zamindari system).
 · Indirect systems, where land was allocated to groups with total or partial 
revenue exemption, and where cultivators had no direct relationship 
with the state.
 · Direct systems where the state bureaucracy collected revenue direct from 
the owner (often known as the ryotwari system).
 · Intermediate systems, where the obligation to pay land revenue was 
attached to rights in land and assigned jointly to members of a group, 
typically a lineage or family. Depending on the composition of the group 
(ranging from a collective of cultivators to an individual), these 
arrangements could be more or less direct (resembling ryotwari or 
zamindari systems respectively).
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The research moves discussion away from the emotive issues associated 
with ‘traditional’ institutions, and offers a more neutral approach to 
thinking about the bewildering diversity of informal local governance. In 
terms of our drawing analogy, it helps close off unhelpful models and 
assumptions. The hypothesis – that ILGIs’ performance today is linked to 
their colonial era origins and subsequent history – chimes with the 
findings of other scholars about the negative impact of indirect forms of 
colonial rule on subsequent development outcomes in Africa and 
elsewhere. It provides an objective basis for undertaking an initial 
assessment of the characteristics and likely impact of very different kinds 
of informal local governance arrangements. 
There is no easy or automatic link between such an assessment and 
specific policy recommendations. Whether on balance particular ILGIs 
should be valued because they offer benefits to poor people in their area, 
or opposed because they perpetuate poverty depends on what the 
alternatives are. However the finding that current, unequal development 
outcomes in Punjabi villages are strongly influenced by historic land 
settlement patterns does help explain a long-standing development puzzle 
in Pakistan: the persistence of very poor human development indicators 
despite relatively good economic growth and high levels of development 
aid. The findings also point to the need for more intelligent targeting of 
development efforts and offer a practical starting point: the Punjab 
planning department has commissioned follow-on research with the 
specific objective of better understanding ‘backward’ villages and 
addressing their needs. 
More tentatively, the research provides insights into how democracy 
actually works at a very local level in Punjab, which might indicate ways 
to improve the impact of the 2001 local government reforms. Instead of 
relying on electoral competition at the union level to improve effective 
allocation of development resources, there may be a case for more 
targeted approaches supported by evidence-based planning to give greater 
weight to equity considerations.
The research findings can also help policymakers follow ‘Do no harm’ 
principles. For example, there is a real risk that superficial assumptions 
about so-called ‘traditional’ institutions will lead to them being 
incorporated into formal governance arrangements in inappropriate 
ways. The 1996 Panchayats (Extension of the Scheduled Areas) Act in 
India formally recognises ‘traditional tribal institutions’ as the lowest 
level of formal governance in areas populated mainly but not exclusively 
by members of Scheduled Tribes. The implementation process remains 
fraught, not least because this legislation formally excludes from 
participation or representation in local government the significant 
proportion of people not registered as ‘tribal’. Similar risks apply to 
proposals to incorporate traditional institutions into formal governance 
 Whether 
ILGIs should be 
valued because 
they offer 
benefits to poor 
people or 
opposed 
because they 
perpetuate 
poverty depends 
on what the 
alternatives are.
an UPs IDe  DoWn v I eW of  governance
58
structures in Afghanistan without detailed, objective assessment of how 
they actually operate and affect the daily lives of poor people.
To end on a positive note: while research findings from Punjab and 
Rajasthan highlight how persistent institutional legacies can be, the 
findings from Karnataka show that ILGIs can change relatively rapidly if 
the external political and administrative environment changes. Post-
independence reforms in Karnataka (which included early moves towards 
decentralisation, reinforced by the 1992 Panchayati Raj legislation) have 
shifted incentives and opportunities for informal village councils. They 
are providing an effective link between poor rural communities and the 
formal state, and actively contributing to building new forms of public 
authority.  
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6.1 Introduction
Phase 1 of the CFS research argued that taxation matters fundamentally 
for governance: tax bargaining between the state and its citizens to create 
a social fiscal contract is central to building effective and accountable 
public authority (Moore 2007). The research has sparked widespread 
interest among international donors, NGOs and (most strikingly) 
politicians and senior tax officials in Africa.
The Phase 1 findings were based on the historical experience of countries 
in Western Europe, some contemporary evidence from developing 
countries, and evidence that countries not dependent on citizens for 
taxation govern badly (the so-called ‘resource curse’). Phase 2 of the 
research has tested these findings in finer detail, tracing the links between 
taxation and government accountability and responsiveness in Ghana, 
Kenya and Ethiopia. It has also looked at the reverse situation, where 
governments enjoy ‘windfall’ revenues from the export of oil, gas and 
mining products. Specifically, it has compared the recent experience of 
governments in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru in managing huge increases in 
non-tax revenues.  
Development policymakers have long seen public financial management 
as central to economic and social development – albeit with an emphasis 
on expenditure rather than revenue-raising. The CFS research highlights 
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the importance of both for governance. It shows: how sources of revenue 
shape the interests of political elites; how processes of bargaining with 
taxpayers can increase government accountability and responsiveness; 
how pre-existing institutions and the political context shape the way 
governments manage booms in natural resource revenues; and why 
formal mechanisms (such as decentralisation and revenue-sharing 
arrangements) will not work well if they take insufficient account of that 
context.
6.2 Taxation and accountability in Ghana, Kenya and   
      Ethiopia
The history of Western Europe, and especially of Britain in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, provides the clearest 
evidence that state-society bargaining over taxation helps strengthen 
government capacity, accountability and responsiveness to citizens. The 
British monarch faced a direct challenge from taxpayers and bondholders 
who sat or were represented in parliament. The situation in poor 
countries today is very different and much less clear-cut. Governments do 
not face the kind of external threats that historically gave rulers and ruled 
strong common interests in bargaining over taxation. Taxpayers are more 
diverse, with fewer shared interests; and taxpayers are commonly also 
beneficiaries of government spending or employment. Many governments 
have alternative sources of revenue from natural resource rents and aid.
Key findings
 · The contemporary experience of Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia 
provides clear evidence of a broad causal mechanism linking 
government reliance on taxation with pressures for increased 
responsiveness and accountability. Within this broad mechanism, 
three more specific causal processes were identified:
 i) direct tax bargaining with citizens, which led to particular   
  episodes of political reform;
 ii) tax resistance by citizens in response to unpopular governments,  
  which created more indirect pressures for change and subsequent  
  reform;
 iii) taxation as a catalyst for strengthening civil society    
  organisations, and encouraging mobilisation around broader   
  common interests.
 · Political context and other contingent factors shaped these 
processes. In Ghana, a more open political system facilitated direct 
bargaining over taxation. In Kenya and especially in Ethiopia, overt 
public action was much more muted but resistance to taxation by 
unpopular governments created indirect pressures for change
(Prichard 2009 and forthcoming)
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Nevertheless, the research shows that in all three cases – even in the very closed 
political environment of Ethiopia – government reliance on taxation has 
created pressures for greater accountability and responsiveness to citizens.
Ghana
A review of the period 1981–2008 shows that people’s willingness to pay tax 
was closely linked to their perceptions of government. Governments were able 
to expand taxation with little overt political opposition while they enjoyed 
broad public support. Examples include the PNDC government in the early 
stages of the revolution, despite coercive tax collection, the NDC government 
after the ending of an opposition boycott of parliament in 1996, and the newly 
elected NPP government in 2000, which achieved dramatic increases in public 
revenue. Conversely, taxation became more contentious and difficult when 
political conflict peaked following contested elections in 1992, and when the 
NDC government lost political support in the late 1990s.
In addition to this implicit bargaining, there were clear episodes of explicit 
bargaining around taxation which strengthened government accountability 
and helped fuel the movement for political liberalisation. These included tax 
protests by small traders which were an early sign of popular resistance to the 
PNDC regime. Most tellingly, two critical political moments for the first NDC 
government both centred on taxation. A public outcry over petroleum tax in 
1993, and major protests that forced the government to withdraw the 
introduction of VAT in 1995 both helped to provide the impetus for a more 
inclusive and open parliament after 1996.
Tax bargaining also directly increased government responsiveness. 
Government moves to increase VAT rates in 1999 and 2003 caused 
strong public protests. In both cases government responded by agreeing 
to commit all new tax revenues to specific, popular social programmes, 
leading to the creation of the Ghana Education Trust Fund and the 
National Health Insurance Scheme. The result was some increased 
oversight of the funds (despite limitations and controversies surrounding 
earmarking as a fiscal practice).
Conflicts over taxation catalysed the formation or strengthening of civil 
society groups which have contributed to improvements in governance more 
broadly. The Committee for Joint Action, founded in the aftermath of the 
1995 anti-VAT protests, subsequently broadened its focus to become an 
organiser of mass public mobilisation around issues of political liberalisation, 
corruption and poverty reduction. The primary driving factor in the 
expansion of the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) after 1991 was an 
effort to get tax-compliant firms exempt from upfront payments of VAT. The 
new political assertiveness of the AGI persisted far beyond the initial 
advocacy campaign.
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Kenya
The story in post-independence Kenya is much more complex than in 
Ghana. There has been relatively little overt conflict over taxation, and 
even less evidence of specific episodes of tax bargaining. This is surprising 
because the tax take in Kenya is the highest in the region, and 
Afrobarometer surveys show that Kenyans are more hostile to unfair 
taxation than Ghanaians.
There have been some examples of direct tax bargaining and conflict over 
taxation. There was a failed attempt by transport operators to mobilise 
against the Road Maintenance Levy (first introduced in 1994 and 
earmarked for roads, thus attracting some public support). The United 
Business Association (UBA) led opposition to the introduction of 
electronic tax registers in all VAT-registered shops, but the government 
made no concessions (and the UBA attracted the label of ‘Asian tax 
evaders’ despite being led by an African). There was some narrow elite 
bargaining through which MPs won concessions from government over 
the introduction of capital gains tax and taxation of MPs’ benefits.
Overall, however, what is striking is the lack of resistance to the 
introduction of highly visible income and corporation taxes, and to 
broad-based taxes on fuel and VAT (this despite the fact that VAT was 
introduced during a period of considerable political turmoil prior to the 
1992 election).
There are several reasons why tax bargaining in Kenya has been so 
muted. One is that, until 2003, Kenyan politics were relatively closed and 
repressive. Yet there are no major examples of tax bargaining after 2003 
despite big increases in revenue collection. This suggests another 
explanation – that Kenya has a long tradition of relatively effective tax 
collection, and successive governments have employed careful political 
strategies in introducing new taxes, implementing gradual ‘reform by 
stealth’. A further factor has undoubtedly been the racial divisions in the 
country: the economically dominant Asian and European minorities are 
excluded from politics and unable to mobilise widespread political 
support. They have therefore pursued narrow, exclusive interests in 
relation to taxation.
Yet the absence of discrete episodes of tax bargaining does not mean that 
taxation has not stimulated increased responsiveness and accountability. 
As in Ghana, the popularity and perceived legitimacy of successive 
governments has shaped their ability to raise revenue. The fiscal weakness 
of unpopular regimes has added to the pressure for change. For example, 
from the mid-1980s onwards the Moi government had increasing 
difficulty in raising revenue. However the 1992 elections increased its 
legitimacy, leading to a dramatic period of tax reform and a big surge in 
revenue collection. But in the late 1990s revenue fell rapidly following a 
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controversial election in 1997. Although much of the decline was due to 
an economic crisis, it was also the result of explicit efforts by businesses 
aligned with the opposition to evade existing taxes, resist new taxes and 
weaken the fiscal position of the state. This helped precipitate the defeat 
of the Moi government in the 2002 election. The new NARC government 
increased political openness and made tax reform a major priority, 
seeking explicitly to link improved tax compliance to success in 
increasing political freedom and expanding popular social programmes.
There is also some evidence that taxation has provided an important 
basis for the development of business associations, including small and 
medium enterprises (notably the United Business Association) and the 
informal sector. More recently, the Centre for Governance and 
Development in Kenya (CGD) decided to participate in founding the 
National Taxpayers Association, with the explicit goal of linking tax 
advocacy to expenditure monitoring. The message that paying tax can be 
a basis for making claims on government has resonated well with the 
public, notably in relation to monitoring expenditure under the 
Community Development Fund.
In summary, while political debate and conflict around taxation has been 
relatively rare in Kenya and there are few examples of explicit tax 
bargaining, it seems clear that taxation has been a significant (if not 
decisive) indirect stimulus for the expansion of responsiveness and 
accountability. A telling recent example of the way government reliance 
on tax revenues shapes its behaviour came with the 2007–08 post-
election crisis, the economic costs of which were directly felt by the 
political elite. The business community used its status as taxpayers to call 
for an early resolution of the political impasse, and explicitly threatened 
to withhold tax revenues if the government failed to comply.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia presents a sharp contrast to Ghana and Kenya. It offers strong 
evidence historically of the importance of tax bargaining in broader state 
building. During the imperial period (1855–1972) conflict over taxation 
became a catalyst for political change; systems of feudal administration 
were replaced by central bureaucracies. But the experience of Ethio-
pia had more in common with that of Eastern Europe than of Western 
Europe. Landlords and the church retained authority at a local level, and 
resisted taxation; coercive administration through the landed nobility 
became entrenched and the central state had only an indirect relationship 
with the majority of the population. The outcome was not a tax bargain 
leading to broad-based accountability, but revolution.
Today Ethiopia remains autocratic, lacking political openness and 
competitive politics. Under the Derg (1974–91) government control was 
so strong that public opinion had little bearing on revenue-raising 
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(although fiscal weakness did contribute to its collapse). Under the 
successor EPRDF government there was a degree of political 
liberalisation, especially between 2001 and 2005, and the nationalised 
economic system was dismantled. The government undertook tax reform, 
and there was a rapid increase in revenue. Yet there was little public 
response: this was especially striking in relation to the introduction of VAT 
that affected the majority of the population. Nor was there significant 
public reaction to enforcement of trade, income and sales taxes.
One exception – and a rare example of tax bargaining – was the 
introduction of a presumptive tax on business, which provoked public 
outcry, especially in the Amhara region. Government responded by setting 
up a commission to study the broader fairness of the tax. Following the 
contested 2005 elections, government reduced rates for the presumptive 
tax, expanded participation in the assessment process, and created new 
forums for public consultation about tax collection and expenditure. It also 
relaxed compliance more generally, resulting in a rapid decline in the 
overall tax take.
Yet public discussion of taxation is still rare. There is no organisation of 
business associations or civil society groups in response to taxation. The 
political opposition claim that tax was not a major issue, either before or 
after the 2005 elections. While the government’s retreat over taxation in 
2005 suggests that they saw it as significant in shaping public opinion, the 
resulting fiscal squeeze did not lead to a change of regime. From 2008, as 
political turmoil subsided and with the opposition weakened, government 
stepped up the revenue effort accompanied by more aggressive enforcement 
– with no overt public reaction.
So the picture presented by Ethiopia is mixed. It is clear that taxation offers 
no easy, short-term route to increasing government accountability and 
responsiveness, especially in a closed political environment. There is also 
some evidence that high levels of aid to Ethiopia have helped erode 
government’s incentives for revenue bargaining. Nevertheless, public 
perceptions of government have shaped its ability to raise revenue; and 
recent moves to increase consultation and transparency of tax collection 
represent significant gains, given the broader context. As was the case in 
both Ghana and Kenya, reliance on taxation has indirectly shaped the 
behaviour of government, even without overt public protest or explicit 
bargaining. This could contribute to quiet political change over the longer 
term.
In summary, these three case studies present clear evidence of:
i) explicit tax bargaining leading to increased accountability and 
responsiveness from government (notably protests over VAT in Ghana, 
and over presumptive tax in Ethiopia);
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ii) tax resistance that indirectly created pressures for change, and 
incentives for further reform (notably following the 1997 elections in 
Kenya, contributing to a fiscal crisis and a change of government in 
2002);
iii) taxation as a catalyst for broad civil society mobilisation. Here the 
role of taxation in mobilising business associations could be 
particularly significant, if tax provides a basis for mobilisation away 
from exclusive rent seeking to more broadly-based engagement around 
common interests, with the potential for productive outcomes.
6.3 Implications for tax reform and aid management
There is already substantial, ongoing work among international donors 
(notably within the DAC) to consider the links between taxation and 
state capacity, accountability and responsiveness. The broad message is to 
recognise that taxation is not just a fiscal issue, but is of central 
importance for governance. More specifically, the work on tax-
governance linkages has stimulated donor support for the African Tax 
Administration Forum, contributed to debate about the impact of aid on 
domestic accountability, and stimulated a more detailed look at priorities 
for tax reform (OECD forthcoming, a). 
The ongoing DAC work on tax reform, partly inspired by the CFS 
research, provides a good example of the practical implications of 
‘turning the picture upside down’. The overall message is to pay much 
more attention to the political dynamics of tax reform and tax collection, 
with sensitivity to the particular country context. Moreover, 
recommendations emerging from the CFS research suggest that instead of 
going for technocratic, politically low-key approaches aimed at increasing 
revenue mobilisation in the short term, policymakers should be bolder in 
addressing politically difficult issues that can contribute to more 
productive bargaining, increased tax compliance and improved 
accountability and responsiveness in the longer term.
Specifically, equity is seen to be a key issue, including more focus on 
personal income and property taxes as well as more equitable 
enforcement – all of which could increase public perceptions of fairness, 
and therefore improve compliance. How tax is collected matters, not just 
how much: efforts to reduce arbitrary and coercive collection, including 
at a local level, deserve priority, as do measures to increase public 
awareness and transparency over collection and use of tax revenues, and 
improved taxpayer services. Stronger linkages between taxation and 
public expenditure are critical, and could include earmarking in some 
circumstances.
Constructive tax bargaining requires effective mobilisation by civil society 
actors pursuing broad-based common interests rather than narrow, exclusive 
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benefits. So support for more inclusive business associations to organise 
around collective tax concerns could be important, as could support for 
taxpayer associations pursuing a broad-based agenda. Finally, international 
donors in particular should prioritise action at a global level to curb the use 
of tax havens, and tax evasion by OECD individuals and businesses.
6.4 Managing natural resource revenues
Many poor countries have seen huge increases over the last decade in 
revenues from the export of oil, gas and minerals. This provides a 
significant opportunity to reduce poverty and inequality, but spending has 
often been unproductive, while competition for resources can unleash 
new social and economic conflict. 
The CFS research explored the contrasting experiences of Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Peru in managing the boom in natural resource revenues 
(mainly from oil, gas and minerals respectively) between 1995 and 2008. 
It looked at the formal political and institutional arrangements in place 
before the commodities boom and analysed their impact on the strategies 
adopted for allocating and managing natural resource revenues.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Peru the commodities boom started shortly after the country’s return 
to democratic politics in 2001. Peru adopted orthodox policy 
prescriptions advocated by the international financial institutions (IFIs) 
and others, including an ambitious programme of political and fiscal 
decentralisation. Revenue-sharing formulas automatically transferred a 
significant part of mining tax revenues back to mining and non-mining 
areas. However, at the local level, politics were competitive but 
fragmented, lacking strong political parties or well-defined regional 
interests. Although there was competent central management of public 
finances, poor coordination between national, regional and local levels 
undermined attempts to improve revenue management – for example 
through decentralised participatory budgets. Public-private partnerships 
with mining companies created new political actors and interests at local 
level, making coordination more difficult and giving rise to new sources 
of conflict. Local governments lacked the capacity to manage the huge 
increases in revenue resulting from the system of automatic transfers 
Key findings
 · Effective formal state institutions (including functioning political 
parties, and effective decentralised governments) can help mitigate 
the ‘resource curse’, but introducing mechanisms for managing 
natural resource revenues (through decentralisation, earmarking or 
independent oversight bodies) will not work well if they are not 
embedded in the political and institutional context.
(Arellano-Yanguas 2008; Mejía Acosta forthcoming; Albornoz and 
Mejía Acosta forthcoming; Barrantes et al. forthcoming; Laserna et al. 
forthcoming; Prichard 2009 and forthcoming)
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(some mining districts saw a tenfold increase). So, in the case of Peru, 
following ‘best practice’ advice exacerbated pre-existing political, social 
and institutional problems, and appears to have resulted in patterns of 
poor-quality spending, growing socioeconomic inequalities between 
regions, and the spread of social conflicts both in mining and non-mining 
areas.
By contrast, Bolivia had a long tradition of managing natural resource 
rents from the mining sector, pre-dating the advent of the current 
commodities boom by several decades. This consolidated the role of the 
state as the main provider of goods and services to citizens. The 
predominance of the central state was reduced after 1994, when a new 
Popular Participation Law gave sub-national governments – including 
elected municipal councils – a substantial degree of fiscal and 
administrative autonomy from central government.
Fiscal revenues (mainly from the export of gas) more than doubled 
between 2003 and 2008, and triggered immediate demands for 
redistribution from well-organised regional political actors, including 
municipal and regional governments. Although in 2006 president-elect 
Morales had a majority of the popular vote, a cohesive Cabinet, majority 
support in Congress and at provincial and municipal government level he 
nevertheless had to engage in bargaining with local authorities over the 
allocation of natural resource revenues (for example to establish a 
national cash transfer programme). So in this case the potentially 
damaging effects of large natural resource revenue inflows were mitigated 
by a system of vertical checks and balances that reduced the space for 
corrupt, discretionary spending.
Ecuador has been an oil exporting country since the 1970s. In the late 
1990s it undertook important decentralisation reforms, including the 
transfer of 15 per cent of government spending to sub-national 
governments. However, there was no explicit provision to include oil 
revenues as part of these transfers. The boom in oil prices led to dramatic 
increases in fiscal revenues (by 167 per cent) between 2001 and 2008. In 
the absence of an explicit revenue-sharing formula, presidents were able 
to re-centralise control over the new streams of revenue, and to establish 
central government as the main gatekeeper for accessing public funds. 
Preliminary findings suggest that municipalities largely escaped the 
negative effects of large revenue transfers, but became increasingly 
dependent on central government transfers for political survival. There 
appears to have been good investment at the municipal level but at the 
national level the negative effects of the resource curse, including 
discretionary and inefficient spending patterns, are more apparent. 
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6.5 Implications for policy on resource revenue            
      management
The case studies show that formal political institutions and mechanisms 
for revenue management matter and can improve the governance of 
natural resources. But they also highlight the ways in which a resource 
bonanza can change the underlying configuration of political interests 
around the distribution of these revenues. The case studies show how 
standard remedies for mitigating the resource curse can backfire if they 
take insufficient account of pre-existing political and institutional 
contexts.
More specifically for policymakers, the research suggests that they should 
adapt their advice on natural resource management to take account of a 
country’s pre-existing political and institutional arrangements; the 
institutional fit matters. Without this, formal mechanisms for managing 
natural resource revenues (for example through earmarking or revenue-
sharing formulas) may exacerbate underlying problems.
  
Policymakers 
should adapt 
their advice on 
natural resource 
management to 
take account of 
a country’s pre-
existing political 
and institutional 
arrangements.
69
CHApTER  7   conclUs Ions  an D ImPl Icat Ions  for  Pol Icymakers
7.1 Introduction
There is mounting evidence that many reforms to improve governance by 
strengthening formal, rules-based institutions have had limited impact. 
Donors have responded by recognising the need for more politically 
intelligent, context-specific approaches, and more local ‘ownership’. But 
overall there is still a big gap between donor rhetoric and actual 
behaviour, and for the most part development practice remains donor-
driven and aid-centric.
There are some familiar reasons for this gap between research and 
practice, rhetoric and reality. Research tends to produce either high-level 
advice that is difficult to translate into aid-financed operations (for 
example ‘politics matters’), or detailed findings from case studies that are 
not widely applicable. There are also powerful institutional barriers 
within aid agencies that reinforce the status quo. It is difficult for donors 
to come to terms with the consistent message coming from research and 
evaluation reports that as outsiders they have far less influence over local 
development processes than is often assumed (Unsworth 2009).
However, the CFS research points to a more radical explanation for the 
mismatch between research and practice. Development practitioners, and 
especially Western donors, have mental models of development and of 
their own role in the process that get in the way of accepting and 
applying research findings. Programmes to improve the investment 
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climate, strengthen the rule of law, or fight corruption do not fail just for 
lack of ownership or attention to politics. They fail because they make 
the wrong starting assumption: that progressive change consists in, and 
can be achieved through, strengthening formal, rules-based institutions 
that reflect a clear division between public and private spheres of life. 
This paper advocates a different starting assumption: that effective public 
authority is created in a variety of different ways, through bargaining 
between public and private actors, and that ‘informality’, instead of being 
the main problem, could also be part of the solution. It follows that the 
key to making progress may not be direct external intervention to 
orchestrate and support reform, but more indirect strategies to shift or 
influence the incentives and interests of local actors.
This is not to argue that donors should completely switch their attention 
from strengthening the capacity of formal institutions, to trying to modify 
the evolution of ‘patrimonial’ systems. The former is still important, if 
skilfully executed, and the latter is sheer hubris. But they do need to focus 
less on the long-term destination of rules-based governance, and more on 
incremental ways of making progress in the short-to-medium term 
through coalitions and relationships between key actors. Like our 
aspiring artists, they need to start by ‘turning the picture upside down’ so 
as to challenge a whole raft of preconceptions and often implicit 
assumptions that underpin current development practice. The CFS 
research illustrates vividly why this is important, and suggests some new 
– and sometimes counter-intuitive – ways of making progress.
7.2 Summary of research findings
The overarching finding is that informal institutions and personalised 
relationships are pervasive and powerful and can contribute to 
progressive outcomes in poor countries. Creating formal democratic 
government and market institutions remains a valid long-term aim. But in 
the short-to-medium term informal arrangements and relationships can 
help stimulate investment, improve services, connect citizens to the state 
and facilitate the transition to more inclusive, rules-based governance.
Key findings from individual streams of the research include: 
i)  The global environment creates perverse incentives for political elites  
 to perpetuate fragile states because it gives them access to unearned  
 sources of income from natural resource rents and criminal activities.  
 This weakens their incentives to engage with citizens, build public   
 institutions and nurture the economy. The policy message is to   
 prioritise international action to change such incentives through better  
 financial regulation, multi-stakeholder partnerships, and reform of the  
 international narcotics regime.  
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ii) Relations between holders of political power and holders of economic  
 power are central to creating effective, accountable public authority.  
 Informal relations between politicians and investors that build on   
 common interests can compensate for weak formal property rights  
 and contract enforcement, and boost investment in the short-to-  
 medium term. External policymakers might have a role in facilitating  
 dialogue and supporting collective action by business associations. 
iii) Different types of public sector reform can influence the opportunities  
 for collective actors to shape policy and organise effective monitoring  
 of service delivery. Involvement at significant moments of policy   
 reform can enhance opportunities for effective ongoing engagement.  
 Formal participatory mechanisms may be less important as channels  
 for policy influence than informal networks and relationships.   
 Policymakers should be alert to ways in which the design of public  
 programmes influences the scope for collective action.
iv) Informal (‘traditional’) local governance institutions are persistent,  
 influential and very diverse. The extent to which they exercise   
 effective and acceptable public authority reflects both their origins,  
 and the contemporary institutional context in which they operate.  
 Efforts to improve local governance need to take account of this   
 diversity. Some informal local governance institutions can work   
 synergistically with formal institutions; in other cases they may   
 undermine or weaken them. Looking at the origins of ILGIs might  
 provide a useful guide for better targeting of development programmes.
v) Case studies from Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia provide evidence   
 about the relationship between taxation and accountability that   
 indicates the type of tax reform that should enhance the quality of  
 governance. Governments’ need for tax revenue has driven implicit or  
 explicit bargaining with citizens; tax compliance has been greater   
 under more popular governments whereas deep unpopularity can   
 starve governments of revenue, and in some cases hasten their demise.  
 Tax reform should prioritise equity, transparency and improved   
 collection.
vi) Formal mechanisms for managing natural resource revenues (for example  
 through fiscal decentralisation, earmarking or revenue- sharing formulas)  
 will not work well if they take insufficient account of the political and   
 institutional context. Policymakers need to take account of pre-existing   
 institutions and sub-national political dynamics before offering advice on the  
 management of natural resource revenues.
vii) Evidence from São Paulo and Mexico City suggests that new   
 concepts of political representation are emerging from the activity of  
 civil society actors, operating within participatory governance   
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 mechanisms rather than formal electoral channels or membership  
 organisations. These should be explored on their own terms before  
 assessing their compatibility with democratic norms and processes.
 All these findings have policy implications. In some cases (for example,  
 in relation to tax reform) they are quite detailed and have already   
 stimulated significant policy action. However the value of this research  
 for policymakers does not reside only – or even primarily – in a list of  
 policy messages. Indeed, reducing the findings to such a list would be  
 to miss the point that all of them underline the need for a fundamental  
 reassessment of existing assumptions and preconceptions about   
 governance and development. That is what the next section is about.
7.3 An upside-down view of governance
The meta finding – that informal institutions and personalised 
relationships are pervasive and powerful and can contribute to 
progressive outcomes – is itself an illustration of the benefit of closing off 
mental models based on OECD experience. But each of the research 
streams reveals more specific benefits in terms of reversing or challenging 
conventional assumptions, or identifying unexpected actors or processes 
at work. For example:
 · Chapter 2 shows how the current global environment is quite different 
from the one in which Western state building took place, creating a new 
and historically unprecedented set of challenges, which have until 
recently been neglected by international donors (this is starting to 
change, partly in response to the Phase 1 CFS research). 
 · Chapter 3 challenges conventional assumptions about the importance 
of legal arrangements to protect property rights and enforce contracts, 
and highlights the unexpected role of personalised arrangements in 
building trust and common understanding, thus reducing risks and 
facilitating targeted problem solving. 
 · Chapter 4 calls into question the importance of autonomy for civil 
society actors, and shows that creating participatory mechanisms will 
not necessarily result in collective action. It also identifies some 
unexpected reformers. 
 · Chapter 5 challenges biases for or against ‘traditional’ institutions. 
 · Chapter 6 reinforces Phase 1 messages that tax should be seen not just 
as a fiscal issue but as a governance issue, and that how tax is collected 
matters, as well as how much. 
Turning the picture upside down has been fundamental in identifying the 
original CFS research questions, and prompting detailed investigation of 
very informal arrangements, networks and relationships. This in turn has 
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revealed angles, processes and dynamics at work, the importance of 
which might well not otherwise have been evident.
7.4 New drawing skills
Returning to our drawing metaphor, the research goes beyond telling 
policymakers to close off their mental models of development, and look 
at what is actually happening. It offers new ‘drawing skills’ – by 
providing some pointers to the kind of relationships and informal 
arrangements that seem particularly important in creating more effective, 
accountable public authority, the circumstances in which they may 
emerge, and the ways in which they can support a transition to more 
inclusive, formal arrangements. This guidance is captured below in a list 
of questions that policymakers will find relevant in a great variety of 
circumstances, and that in turn prompt more detailed inquiry. These are, 
of course, not the only questions worth asking, but they do cover many 
of the strategic issues bearing on development practice. In particular, all 
the questions relate in one way or another to the critical issue of how to 
get more effective collective action among societal groups, and more 
constructive bargaining between public and private actors. The answers 
to the questions provide important insights into the underlying challenges 
of creating effective public authority in a given context, and suggest 
priorities for action and possible strategies for external actors. The 
questions draw on the findings of many other scholars; their significance 
has in turn been validated and illustrated by the CFS research.
 
How are history and context (political, institutional, economic, cultural) 
shaping formal and informal institutions, interests and relationships?
All CFS research streams highlight the importance of context and history 
– at the global, national and sub-national levels. Particularly striking is 
the way political and institutional context and historical trajectories have 
shaped networks of collective actors in São Paulo and Delhi (Chapter 4), 
help explain the very different performance of ILGIs in Karnataka and 
Pakistani Punjab, constrain the scope for tax bargaining in Kenya and 
Ethiopia, and contribute to the contrasting experiences of Peru, Bolivia 
and Ecuador in managing the recent boom in natural resource revenues. 
Most political economy frameworks used by donors highlight these 
issues, but the implications for development policy are often not pursued.
 
What is shaping interests of political elites? (Sources of revenue are 
likely to be critical.)
This question, as vividly illustrated in Chapter 2, is central to 
understanding the phenomenon of weak/‘fragile’/‘failed’ states. It is also 
critical to understanding underlying causes of weak economic growth  
(Chapter 3), and the prospects for more constructive tax bargaining and 
better management of natural resource revenues (Chapter 6).
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Are there common interests, among and between public and private 
actors, which could produce ‘win/win’ outcomes? In particular, what is 
shaping relations between politicians and investors, and might they have 
common interests in supporting productive investment?
Chapters 2 and 3 both illustrate why relations between holders of 
political power and holders of economic power are fundamental to 
creating and sustaining effective public authority. The power of 
bargaining around common interests is highlighted in accounts of how 
very informal arrangements between politicians and private investors 
stimulated productive investment in Egypt, Indonesia and China (Chapter 
3), in cases of successful health and social assistance reform in São Paulo 
and Delhi (Chapter 4), and in accounts of tax bargaining and tax 
resistance in Ghana, Kenya and Ethiopia (Chapter 6).
 
What might stimulate effective collective action by societal groups to 
demand better services, or to support or resist public policy?
Chapter 2 illustrates how the absence of elite interest in engaging with 
citizens results in a lack of collective action, which fundamentally 
undermines attempts to create public authority. Chapter 3 notes that the 
way the private sector is organised influences how effective it is in 
supporting more inclusive engagement with public officials. Chapter 4 
highlights the fundamental importance of collective action around policy 
reform and social accountability in improving service delivery, and 
investigates the processes involved. Chapter 5 shows how collective 
action through informal local government institutions in Karnataka (to 
access development funds and contest elections) was stimulated by the 
activities of elected local councils. Chapter 6 highlights the potential for 
business associations to mobilise their members around broad-based, 
common demands relating to taxation rather than exclusive, narrow 
interests. All these cases reconfirm the broad finding of Phase 1 of the 
research: how public programmes are designed and implemented shapes 
opportunities and incentives for collective action by citizens.
 
What informal institutions are operating (especially in rural areas), and 
how are they interacting with formal institutions? Are they competing 
with or undermining effective public authority?
This issue is most directly addressed in Chapter 5, which reveals the 
persistent influence of informal village institutions in Karnataka, 
Rajasthan and Pakistani Punjab, and their very diverse outcomes. 
However, the question is relevant in most poor countries where 
governance is problematic, particularly in Africa where ‘traditional’ 
institutions (with origins in systems of indirect rule) remain prominent, 
and in ‘fragile’ situations where state authority and legitimacy is weak.
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Chapters 2 and 6 specifically address this question, which was also a 
major focus of the Phase 1 CFS research. Over the last five years 
policymakers have increasingly recognised the importance of links 
between taxation and the quality of governance. This has stimulated a 
new and growing stream of work on taxation and accountability within 
the OECD DAC Govnet (OECD 2008), linked to work by the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs to promote a more transparent, international 
tax environment. It is also stimulating new bilateral programmes to 
support tax reform. Perhaps the most important and interesting initiative 
has been the establishment of the African Tax Administration Forum 
which brings together senior African tax officials with the aim of 
facilitating cooperation between tax administrations, and which has 
attracted the support of African heads of state. It explicitly recognises 
that efficient and effective tax administration is central to creating 
capable states, as well as to economic development and good governance.
Asking these questions provides a way for policymakers to start 
identifying the kind of state-society dynamics at work in a given situation 
that might produce constructive short-term outcomes. It may also suggest 
ways in which informal processes have the potential to pave the way for 
more rules-based arrangements in the longer term. The CFS research 
provides examples that are of interest not because they offer models to 
follow but because they stimulate thinking and useful questions. In Egypt 
the research shows how relationships that initially offered exclusive 
benefits subsequently had a positive impact on a whole business sector, 
and became more open and institutionalised over time. In Ghana tax 
bargaining has contributed directly to political reform. In São Paulo new, 
unorthodox forms of representation are emerging informally through the 
engagement of civil society organisations in participatory governance 
mechanisms. In Karnataka the interaction of elected village councils with 
very informal institutions is contributing to more effective and 
accountable local governance.
7 .5 Implications for policymakers
Taxation is a relatively unusual example of the CFS research directly 
stimulating and informing practice by international donors. It reflects the 
fact that there are common interests around tax reform: developing 
country governments are keen to increase revenue and reduce aid 
dependency; African tax officials have professional interests at stake; 
donors see an opportunity to increase finance for development and 
improve governance; in the wake of the financial crisis, OECD 
governments are increasingly concerned to improve international 
financial regulation and reduce opportunities for tax evasion and 
avoidance. There is also a good institutional ‘fit’ with current donor 
practice: donors can readily see ways of using money and technical 
assistance directly to support reform.
  Informal 
processes have 
the potential to 
pave the way for 
more rules-
based 
arrangements in 
the longer term.
an UPs IDe  DoWn v I eW of  governance
76
Most other examples of direct policy influence relate to links with local 
policymakers interested in using context-specific findings to inform policy 
interventions. For example, findings from the research around the right to 
food and the public distribution system in Delhi have been shared with 
policymakers and civil society activists working on new Right to Food 
legislation in India. CFS research on health in Delhi is of direct interest to 
policymakers concerned with urban health issues. The CFS partner 
organisation in São Paulo, the Centro Brasileiro de Análise e 
Planejamento (CEBRAP), has organised large-scale training programmes 
for NGOs, members of participatory councils and municipal councils in 
Brazil, drawing on research findings about the new forms of political 
representation and accountability that are emerging within participatory 
governance mechanisms. Officials in both Karnataka and Pakistani 
Punjab have picked up on CFS research into informal local governance 
institutions.
However, it is much less clear that the central messages from the research 
are informing donor policy thinking and practice more broadly, despite 
extensive dissemination of the Phase 1 findings, and ongoing discussion 
of the emerging Phase 2 findings. Donors are not routinely asking the 
kind of questions set out in Section 7.4 above, or following through on 
their implications. This is not because the importance of such questions is 
actively disputed, or because they have no practical implications for 
policy. But they do not offer a good institutional or ideological fit with 
the organisational culture of most development agencies.
Taking such questions seriously implies a change in how donors see their 
role – from being experts with responsibility for ‘delivering’ on the 
millennium development goals, to at best being effective facilitators of 
local political processes. It means letting go of implicit assumptions that 
aid can buy reform and ‘good’ behaviour, and that the interests of donors 
and aid recipient governments are generally well aligned around an 
OECD vision of development. The search for improved aid effectiveness 
needs to start not with improving delivery mechanisms, but with a much 
better understanding of the local social, institutional and political 
dynamics with which aid programmes are interacting. This in turn 
implies big (and uncomfortable) changes in the organisational culture and 
incentives of development agencies.
None of this is very new. The same story emerges repeatedly in one form 
or another from development research, policy papers and donor 
evaluations. Recent papers for the DAC International Network on 
Conflict and Fragility, for example, all emphasise that development and 
‘state building’ are endogenous processes, that state-society relations are 
key to improving security and delivering public goods, that local 
perceptions of legitimacy are fundamental, and that donors need to be 
much more alert to the impact of aid (positive and negative) on local 
  The search 
for improved aid 
effectiveness 
needs to start 
with a much 
better 
understanding 
of the local 
social, 
institutional and 
political 
dynamics with 
which aid 
programmes are 
interacting.
77
CHApTER  7   conclUs Ions  an D ImPl Icat Ions  for  Pol Icymakers
capacity and incentives for progressive change (OECD/DAC 2010 and 
forthcoming, b). There is also growing recognition that global shifts in 
economic and geopolitical relations have fundamentally changed the 
operational context for Western donors, and that traditional models of 
donor-recipient relationships need to change.
This paper has argued that donors cannot make significant progress in 
improving development outcomes and aid effectiveness without changing 
their mental models of how development happens. However, the good 
news is that, if they do ‘turn the picture upside down’ and investigate in a 
much more open-minded way what is actually happening in a given 
context, they will see new opportunities as well as challenges. For 
example they could do much more to:
 · value country knowledge and invest in acquiring it;
 · empower local actors at all levels through good-quality research and 
support for data collection and policy analysis;
 · play a role in facilitating local dialogue and debate;
 · prioritise action on things that external actors can directly influence, 
and that are fundamental to shaping elite interests in poor countries. In 
particular, they should prioritise a small number of strategic global 
initiatives that are central to regulating global financial flows, oil 
revenues and the narcotics trade;
 · ensure they are alert to ways in which all their actions can impinge 
(positively or negatively) on opportunities for constructive state-society 
bargaining. Issues around tax reform and aid dependency are 
particularly salient and are already on the DAC agenda (although there 
has been disappointingly little effective action to address the long-
acknowledged problems arising from aid fragmentation);
 · reassess their strategies for supporting civil society, with less focus on 
pursuing a specific rights-based agenda, and more on the capacity of 
different groups to take effective collective action. This would involve 
extending engagement to a broader range of actors, who may not share 
a conventional view of governance and development but who have 
overlapping interests, for example in promoting economic growth;
 · overall, show less concern with micromanaging aid, and much more 
with the political dynamics that influence its effectiveness.
There are powerful factors that are already prompting Western donors to 
re-examine their role and practices, including the very different approach 
to aid adopted by China (Brautigam 2009), growing recognition of the 
interdependence of rich and poor countries in an increasingly globalised 
world (DFID 2009a), and mounting concern about the security and 
development challenges posed by fragile states. But it is not clear that, 
despite the significant pressures, Western donors are seriously 
reappraising their understanding of development and in particular of the 
processes involved in creating more effective and accountable states.
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Hence the central message of this paper – that donors need to turn the 
picture upside down, and develop new drawing skills. Unless they do so, 
they will not make the necessary investment in understanding local 
political dynamics, or make fundamental changes in their own 
organisation, values, attitudes and behaviour. In short, they will find it 
very difficult to resist the temptation to revert to the default position of 
viewing the world through an OECD lens. 
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Informal institutions and personalised relationships are 
usually seen as governance problems. However the research 
presented in this synthesis paper suggests that they can also 
be part of the solution. Donors have had limited success in 
trying to improve the investment climate, reform public services and fight 
corruption in poor countries by strengthening formal, rules-based institutions. 
They need to stop thinking about governance and development challenges in 
terms of models based on OECD experience, and instead pay much more 
attention to the informal institutions, relationships and interests that underpin 
formal arrangements. 
 
Informality is a fact of life. Policymakers seeking to better understand this messy, 
complex reality might start by asking themselves:
•	What is shaping the interests of political elites? (Sources of revenue are likely 
to be critical).
•	What is shaping relations between politicians and investors, and might they 
have common interests in supporting productive investment?
•	What might stimulate and sustain collective action by social groups to demand 
better services?
•	What informal local institutions are at work, and how are they influencing 
development outcomes?
•	Where does government get its revenue from, and how is that shaping its 
relationships with citizens?
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